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LIVE ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
FROM MINOR DONORS IN
MASSACHUSETTS
Crr¿nrns H. BenoN*
Mencor Borsr.ono** Gennrcx F. CoLE*x*
I. INrnooucrroN
Accelerating progress in medicine continually presents our legal system
with complex legal and ethical problemsl and has resulted in the de-
velopment of a new forensic medicine. Because some of the world's
greatest medical facilities are located in Massachusetts, these medico-legal
problems have been especially acute for the commonweakh's legislatuie,
bar and courts. one such problem, which the Massachusetts legal system
was the first to confront, is that of live organ and tissue transplants from
minor donors.z At the present stage of transplant technology, a minor is
frequently the most acceptable prospective donor when a sibli.rg needs a
new organ or tissue-such as a kidney or bone ¡¡¿¡¡evg-þscause of the
high degree of genetic similarity among siblings.s Genetic similarity is
important because it decreases the dangers of organ rejection and adverse
bodily reactions.a
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* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. 4.8., University of pennsylvania, lgSB;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1g72. professor Baron
was.the guardian ad litem in Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 7+l0g (Mass., Oct. 4, lg74).** 4.8., Barnard College, 1969; J.D., Nõrtheastern Uliversity School of Law, 1973.
Associate, Hill & Barlow, Boston.
*x* 8.4., Harvard College, 1968; J.D., Bosron College Law Schôol, 1973. Staff Attorney,
National Consumer Law center, Inc., Boston. Mr. cole was the guardian ad litem in Nathair
v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass., July Z, 1974).
The authors wish to thank Fay Saber, a second-year student at Boston College Law School,for her invaluable assistance in.the preparation of this article.1 For an examination of one such problem see Psychosurgery-A Symposium, 54 B.U.L.
Rev.215 (1974).
2 The first cases involving transplants from minors occurred in Massachusetts in 1g57.
T9r^r^.I l. Harrjson, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq. No.68666 (Mass., Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass.,June 12, l9i7);see
Currãn, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 8gl(1959); notes 19-47 and, accompanfng text injra.3 Siblings are most frequently calledupon tó be bone marrow transplant donors. Efforts
are presently being inade to deVelop a computer store of information regarding the genetic
types of large_numbers ofjndividuals with the hope of achieving sufficientty close mãtching
between unrelated individuals. Horbever, there ãre no reportèd cases of'successful bonã
marrow transplants between nonsiblings. Telephone interview with Paul I. Terasaki, M.D.,
Professor of Surgery, U.C.L.A. School of Medicine, Los Angeles, Nov. 15, 1g74. Siblings are
less frequently called upon to serve as kidney donors because in many cases kidneys-from
unrelated or nonliving sources can be successfully transplanted; in addition, long-term renal
dialysis may be an alternative to a transplant. In some cases, however, the genetiãaily similar,
liv.e minor donor presents the most attractive transplant source for a patient with renal
failure., For a comparison between rates of success ofiransplants from caãavers and various
living donors see the I lth Report of the Human Renal Tiansplant Registry, 226 J.A.M.A.l le? (1973).
- 
a rhe human body has a tendency to destroy foreign tissue, organs, or blood. In order
for a transplant op€ration to be successful, the recipiént's immunõlogical system must not
reject and destroy the transplanted tisiue or organ. In addition, the poisibility exists that the
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of the Massachusefts supreme Judicial court, sitting in single justice
tion in Child eb- f . iã¿i"t. 1 45, | 46 ( 1975). The probabilitv of either Î'C",1 -1,"f:1",1.:1;ï:if:.ïäi;";.*;i"i; i."J;;;út.är,1.a to th. g.,,.ii. characieristics:{_tl1*:ï:i1.:};
;:äiil"ilJ"Ë[".ä;å technálogy has not yeî attained- comPlete control over t1'e bodv's;:Ï'::ì;;ti:;.t;; -;h" 
',." 
.r a.,T'.tu related donors offers the greatest hope of success inimniunological system, the use of cloiely
a transplant operation. A, rh;;;;;iit"å' t"ly úblings-are :"lfrttî'l,1::-i::t:l: C^î:i:il;h.i,;ïö;;;';*6-o;;-Ãu..o*',ru.,.pl""r'f see geruratty llth Report of the
u,,ø¡n Do-"l^'tränsnlent Reoistrv- subra note 3.Human Renal-Trãnsplant gi y, þ
5 
.S¿¿ W. Prosser. ihe La* of Torts l0t-08S¿  ,  w-  l  (4th ed' f 97l)'
when this problem firsr arose in 1957, the Massachusetts legal system
could have responded in one of four ways: it could have barred all such
operations on the ground that effective consent was impossible; it could
hàve redefrned the common law principles governing parents' power to
consent to such operations and ff¿ated ìhut ãottsettt as effective; it could
have lowered the ãge of majority and treated some children's willingness
to serve as donors as effecãve consent;1l or it could have developed a
special procedure through which an official tribunal miglìt authorize the
tiansplánt. The Massacñ,rt"ttt courts adopted the fourth. alternative' In
the låndmark case of Masden a. Hørrison,l2 the hospital planning to per-
form a kidney transplant operation involving a minor donor instituted a
declaratory judgmenì actioñ seeking a decree authorizing it to perform
the operaíioä without liability for nonnegligently caused injuries' A justice
i
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The major legal problem that this type of medical procedure presents ls
that of oËtainitig eifective consent-that is, consent that will constitute a
complete defense to a battery actions-for the removal of the organ or
tissrre from the donor.6 The prospective donor's minority precludes treat-
ing his willingness to proceed^ as effective consent.T Moreover, because the
op"eration .airrot provide the donor with any physical benefits and be-
.årrr. it presents tËe parents with a conflict of interests,e the strict applica-
tion of Ëstablished cómmon law principles may not permit the parents to
render effective consent for a donor child'lo i
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S¿¿ Bach & Bach, f'o-.,.,ffi.iù õirp"ri,y and GíafrVersus-Host Reaciions, I I Seminarsi- r{pmatnrnow lqr nqz4;i;;;. aà., TL. Medical Ethics of Bone Marrow Transplanta-;"H;;ñ.gy äör tisz+;iàii". 
't à 7y2¡vedicalhood. 86 l. p. i"t. i+f , 1 é ' y organ rejectionor
future well-beine
defendants are Ë,
Findings, Rulingst5 Shortly afterI
t 1957), and Foster v.1957, this procedurebeen employed on n
No. J 74-109 (Mass.,(Mass., Aug. 28, I
1974) (bone marrow
marrow); Camitta v.
Schillinger, Eq. No.
73-l7l (Mass., Sept
Aug,23, l9?3) (
(bone marrow);
v. Peter Bent Bri
Eq. No. 72-177 (Mas
(Mass., Oct. 3, 1972)
(kidney); Wenners v.
Hampers, Eq. No. 7l
(Mass., May 19, 1971
(kidney) (record im
(kidney).
The Suffolk Coun
kidney transplants.
for the hospital invol
Sept. 24, 1974);
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6 For a discussion of tnã-p.JtÀ of consent ìn this context see Curran, suþra note 2, at
892.""?-'The 
majority rule is that a minor cannot effectively consentto -td]:i!.1^:"*dures' W'
Yro"ier, rupío nJte 5, at 102-03. There is, however, lupport for the proposition that minors
should be able ro consen, iã .o"ri". opeiations. Id,. Foi'a discussion òf recent developments
l" l,f".r".fr"r.tt, i., .rr.. involving mirior transplant donors see notes 89-99 and accompany-
inq- ¡ext infra.i s., ,,õt.t 20, 4l and accompanying text infrd'
e S¿¿ notes 4l-42 and accompanying text infra'
ro-Generally, parents o"i/ tt""'ã ,ú. p"owe. to"render consent for their children in contexts
i" .,"nì.r, in.i ïiu æ pri-urily motiv^ated to promote the best interests of the child' For
further discussion see not;;iti3i 
""á "..".pånying text infra' 
For a-general discussion of
iä;;;il;i" itã i"ir.r"-iÇ'.ã"räïi'*Ñ.ír."jAñatomicál Transplãnts^Between Familv
Members-The Problems ËLing Court and Counsel, I Fam' L' Rep' 4035^(1975)'
- -ìi- À M".ru.h,rr.tt, .orr.f .rrUrËq,r..ttly adopted this course in Rappeport v. Stott, Civil No'
J 74-57 (Mass., Aug. 28, lg74). Fàt a di..t."tìon of S¿a¿' see notes 88-99 and accomPanylng
text infra.
- ii Éq. ¡¡o. 6g651 (Mass., June 12, 1957) (all citarions are to slip opinion).
I
I?
t.
a,
;l
i
i
YII
l
I
I
t
Ir,L-
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM MINOR DONO,RS 16I
session,rs 
-implicitly agreed that this procedure was appropriate. Thecourt neither dismissed the action on thè ground that no ãir..tin. consent
could be rendered nor authorized it on the ground that the consent of
either the parents or the l4-year-old donor cõuld be treated as effective.
Instead, it heard evidence and decided for itself whether, under the
circumstances, the operation should be permitted to go forward.ra Two
similar cases were brought in single justìce session oithe Massachusetts
supreme Judicial court in 1957, and each resulted in a decree insulating
the hospital from liabiJity.ls since 1g57, several other jurisdictions havã
r3 The single justice session is an extraordinary arm of the.s"pÃ.".J"a[ãl c-r.t
exercising_original jurisdiction. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.214, $ g'(1974)."
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ta The Masd'm court's oojnion does not explicitly state the basis upon *hi.h th. .or,.t
authorized the minor donor's participation in tihe tránsplant. The courË found that both theparent arrd the minor donor had rèndered informed and voluntary consent. The courtindicated in dictum rhar Zaman v. schultz, lg pa. D. & c. 30g (c.p. î933), and Bonner v.M-o1a1' 126 F.zd 12l (D.C. Cir..-l-941], impliedly established the þropositioí that operatiànsof this 
^character 
were permissible if the^parents alone consented.'Findings, Rulìngs andOrder for Decree at 3. Neither of the citeã cases, however, srands for this"propositiãn. S¿¿
notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra. Masd,m should not be read as ..t"blirhì.tg that theparents' consent is a sufficient basiJ for authorizing a minor donor's participaiion in -a
transplant. Rather, the Masd¿n^cottrt appeared to au"thorize the transplairt on ihe groundthat it would result in a benefit for thè-minor donor:There is little doubt that an operation may be performed upon a minor if it is an
emergency one and done for thè benefit of ihe mìnor even without his consent or thatof his oarents. .
I am'satisfied from the testimony of the psychiatrist that grave emotional impact mavbe visited upon_ [the prospective' donor]'if the defenãañi;' ;d;;-.-;;;?il; ìËiå
operatlon and lthe prospective recipient] should die, as apparently he will.'see.Broa;z u.b.oar! oJ.Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-494. Such emotional'disturbance could well affectthe health and physìcal well-being of [the prospective donor] for the remainder of hisnre. r rnererore hnd that thls operation is necessary for the continued good health andfuture.welt-being of [the p."spá.ii'. ã;'iãiïäîã inåil;';".;i;ä'il]s"tÊËäi..rt¡on tr,.ûerendants are conterrlng a,benefit upon [him] as well ãs upon [ihe recípient].Finrlings, Rulings and Order for Decree at 4 (emphasis added).
. _¡5. shortly after the Mas.den c¿se, Hustey v. Hairison, Eq. ño. 6g666 (Mass., Aug. 80,
1957), and Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov. â0, lg57), werà decided."sinceì957, this-procedure for authorizing transplanis involving legally iniompetent donors has
þ:."_.Ttl?y^.rl-on numerous occasións in lVfassachusetts ãour1s.'Nathanì. Flanagan, Civil
lJ9. J 74-109 (Mass., Oct. 4, 1974) (bone marrow); Rappeport v. Stott, Civil Nol J 74-b7
!YgT.,"4"S. 28, 1974) (bone marrow); Nathan v. rariåêlfi, Eq. No. 7+-SZ 1,l,tass.,";Uy a,1974) (bone marrow); Nathan v. Meekins, Eq. No. 7.t.r09 (N,iass., June lì, rgz+i<uãnémarrow); camitta v. Alcorn, Eq. No. 74-23 (Mais., Feb. 14, l9z4) (bonie marrow); camitta v.
*hjtl-. q::,Eq._No.7-4-lqlya:s.,Jan.3l, l9?4) (bone marrow); 'Camitta v. Fager, Eq. No.73-l7l^(MT:-.Sept.5, 1973) (bone marrow); Camitta v. Martinez, Eq. No. ZgllfA (ùfass.,Aug. 23, 1973) (bo!e marrow); Camitta v. O'Mealia, Eq. No. 73-g6 (ùass., npr. ZS, t9Tfj(bone marrow); Nathan v. clark, Eq. No. ?3-71 (Mass., Apr. rz, rgTB) (ùone marrow); ñicosiá
y. Pgler Bent Bri_gham !"rp.: 
-Eq-. N9. 73-8 (Mass., Feb.-26, t9Z3) (kidney); Nathan v. Dyer,!q.tl". 72-177 (Mass., Dec. ll, t972¡ lbone marrow); Kennedyv. Nathâí, nq. No.72-i36(Mass., Oct. 3, 1972) (bone marrow); DeCaro v. Klein, Eq. No.'22-gg (Mass.,J;ry lg, l9?2)(!idney); Wcnners v. Hampers, Eq. No. ?l-52 (Mass., Sépt. 21, lgZli (kidn;y);'Flold.r, u.
ï3-R.1., Eq, No. 7l-40 (Mass.,4"S.Z, l97l) (kidney); -Cullen v. Hampers,'Eq, No. 7l-4(Mass., May 19, l97l) (kidney); Duiant v. Morales, Eq. No. 69823 (Mäss., Oci. Z, IOZO¡
Ç.i4""y) (record impounded); Chichakly v. Hampers, ni¡. Uo. 69761 (Mass., apr. f, fOZOi(kidney).
,.The Suffolk County Probate Court has also authorized skin grafts and bone marrow andkidney transplants. The records ofthese cases have been impJunded on motion ofcounselfor the hospital involved. E,gi D-urant v. sanro, Eq. No. l0ly'(p. ct., suffolk counry, Mass.,
!çpt 21, 1974); Durant v. G_rillo,-Eg. l!D. _t009Ì¡,. Cr, Sufiotk ior,r,ty, Uass., Sépt. t?,1973); Durant v. Grillo, Eq. No. l00g (p. Ct., Suifolk óounty, nfu.r., Áig_2g,'rcfu).
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faced the problem, and generally they have adopted similar procedures.l6
Despite the widespread acceptance of this procedure, there is growing
dissatisfaction with its use in Massachusetts. The procedure is trouble-
some for a number of reasons. It requires the family to appear in court at
an extremely traumatic time. Given that the Supreme Judicial Court has
always authorized the transplants, one may wonder whether it is necessary
to subject the family to this additional trauma. The court proceedings,
moreover, are time consuming, expensive and difflcult to administer.
Preparation for the hearing takes several days and requires extensive
interviewing of the parents, doctors, children and outside experts. Legal
fees of the hospitals involved are substantial, and the court has experi-
enced increasing difficulty finding qualified attorneys to act as volunteer
guardians ad litem for the minor donors. Considerations such as these
have led some to suggest that the power to authorize these operations
might be given to an administrative tribunal that would make the deci-
sions on an informal basis.lz The existing procedure is also troublesome
because it does not provide the prospective donor with any meaningful
protection. The court proceedings are rarely adversarial and generally do
not include vigorous advocacy of the donor's interest in not participating
in the operation. Moreover, in deciding whether to authorize such opera-
tions, the Supreme Judicial Court has not consistently applied a standard
that reflects serious concern for the donor's interests. These diffrculties,
among others, have prompted a special Massachusetts legislative commis-
sion to create a subcommittee to consider whether the procedure should
continue to be used.rs
This article will examine the system of providing court approval for
organ and tissue transplants from minor donors as it operates in Massa-
chusetts. It will focus principally on the substanrive interests of pro-
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16 Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.zd 386 (Super. Ct. 1972); Howard v.
Fulton-DeKalb Memorial Hosp. Auth., Civil No. 8-90430 (Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga.,
Nov. 29, 1973); Children's Memorial Hosp. v. Lewis, No. 73CH6936 (Cir. Ct., Cook County,
Ill., Nov. 21, 1973); Strunk v. Strunk,445 S.W.2d I45 (Ky. 1969);Inre Richardson,2S4 So.
2d 18.5 (La. App. 1973); Inre Bostrom, Eq. No.49385 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Md.,
J"lg 7, 1974); Smith v. Smith, Eq. No.43919 (Cir. Cr., Monrgomery Õornty, Md.,J;ly 19,
1972); In r¿ Bachman, Fid. No. 20828 (Cir. Ct., Fairfax County, Va., Aug. g, tg7+);lausier
v. Pescinski, No. 668 (Wis., Mar. 4, 1975\.
One notable exception is the state of Washington, where the medical profession made
early advances in the field of bone marrow trãnsplantation. The washington AttorneyGeneral's Office has determined that the written consent of the legal guardianìs sufficient tô
authorize a donation by a minor or other legal incompetent. Léttei from Gerald L. coe,
Assistant Attorney General, State of washington, to charles Baron, Nov. 14, lg74 (on file at
Boston University Law Review). Mr. Coe expressed "serious reservations" regarding the
ade_quacy of the protection of the donor's inieresrs afforded by this procedntË. Id. "17 Letter from George Annas, Director, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston
university school of Law, to Representative william Delahunt, Mar. 10, 1975 (on file at
Boston university I aw Review); Interview with David Nathan, M.D., chief of Hematology,
Childrenì. Hospital Medical Cenrer, Bosron, in Bosron, Oct. g, 1924. This proposaf is
discussed in notes 46-47 anð, accompanying text infra.
18 This subcommittee of the Special Legislative Commission on Human Experimentation
and Experimental Therapy is-sched"led to begin hearings in April 1975. The âuthors of this
artrcle are serving on the subcommittee.
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spective donors and on the extent to which the current procedures af-
ford them adequate protection. It will begin by examining the require-
ment of consent and will demonstrare the necessity of judicial autho-
rization of minor donors' participation in transplant procedures. Next,it will analyze the current Massachusetts practice and assess its capacity
to afford minor donors adequate protection from the possible dangers
of serving as an organ or tissue donor. It will suggest that the Massa-
chusetts system has not adequately protected minói transplant donors.
This article will conclude by proposing a number of reforms in the pres-
ent practice to increase its capacity to protect minor donors.
II. TuE RnquTREMENT oF CouRT Appnove¡-
The Massachusetts requirement that a court authorize a minor donor's
participation in an organ or tissue transplant represents a principled
rejection of alternative merhods of handling the problems posed by iuch
medical procedures. Foreclosing minors from participating as donors
would be undesirable because transplant operations offer the greatest
likelihood of prolonging the life of the recipienrle wirhout unduly
threatening the well-being of the donor.z0 Moreover, the operation may
v
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T
I
t
I
I
t
f
f
1e A transplant may significantly improve the prognosis for a critically ill patient. Kidney
transplants are_ performed for several types of renal failure. Bone marrow ìransplants arê
most frequently performed in cases of aplastic anemia and leukemia but may also be
appropriate in other situations. See generalþ Thomas et al., B,one Marrow Transpiantation,
292 New Eng..f. Med. 832 (1975).
A recent study indicates that the chances of survival for a victim of severe aplastic anemia
may double, from 20 percent to 40 percent, as a result of a bone marrow tra.tsþlant. Camitta
ef al', Selection of Patients for Bone Manow Transplantation in Severe Aplastic Anemia, 4b
Blood 355 (1975). However, the required destruction of the patient's own inarr,r* rnay cause
a number of adverse conditions, such as reproductive failurè and genetic damage. Lévine ¿,
a^1., suþra note 4, at 146. Doctors at the University of Washingto.r ieport signifiðant benefitsfrom bone marrow transplants for some patients sufferlng f¡om acu-te myelogenous
leukemia and acute lymphoblastic anemia. Thomas et at., wþrã. Unfortunately, one conse-
que,nce of a bone marrow transplant is that, if the transplant is unsuccessful, the patient may
luffer 1fa¡ more agonizing death than he would have experienced without the transplani.
S¿¿ A. Etzioni, Genetic Fix 142 (1973).
An assessment of the benefits of a kidney transplant is complicated .by the availability in
many instånces of long-term machine dialysis. In some cases, dialysis may be preferable io a
transplant. 
.on the other hand, 
_a particular individual may be a poor candidate for long-term dialysis. Interview with Robeit Morrison, M.D., Direcior of Renal unit, Lemuel sha"t-
tuck Hospital,.Boston, in Boston, Nov. 18, 1974. Thus, the extent of benefit offered by a
transplant varies in each case. An illustration of an assessment of benefits is provided'by
Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368; 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972), which involved a
kidney transplant from a seven-year-old to her twin sister. In that case the cour¡ found that
with a transplant "there is substantially a 100 percent chance that the twins wiil live out a
normal life span-emotionally and physically." Id. at372,2sg A.2d at 388. The probability
of the prospective recipient's survival for five years with dialysis therapy was estimated to É
50 percent. Id., 285 A.2d at 388.
This article focuses on the interests of the donor in transplant cases and will not discuss
the controversial aspects of the benefit to the recipient. It iì noteworthy, however, that at
least onejudge who hears transplant cases involving rninors appoints a guardian ad litem for
the recipient as well as for rhe donor. Interview with Mary ritzpairick, Judge, suffolkCounty Probate Court, Boston, in Boston, Dec. 5, 1g74.
20 The most immediate cost to any transplant donor is the risk attendant to general
anesthesia. This is estimated to be a one in 5,000 chance of death or paralysis. Among the
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offer the donor the possibility of receiving significant psychological ben-
efits.z1 It would be equally undesirable to permit such operations solely on
the approval of either the parents2z or the prospective donor.because the
minoi'donor would be deprived of the protections provided by the
general requirement that effectil'¿ consent be given prior to rnedical treat-
ment.
The requirement that consent be rendered before an individual is given
thousands of kidney transplants that have been performed, at least five donors have died
il; p..t.p.;ative'complications. Bennett & Harrison, Experience with Living Familial
Renal-Donórs, 134 Surg., Gyne. & Obstet. 894- (1974).
In a bone marrow transplant, the donor is subjected to as many as 200 aspirations of the
p.i;ilbo;;*iitr u 
"..4t.'specially designed to i.-ou. bone 
marrow. Approximately one
þi"t 
"f marrow is removed i.o''' á.r adu-"lt 
and considerably less- from a,child. The marrow
i"g..r..u,.. in a matter of weeks. However, there is a slight possibility.of bone fracture, bone
i;Fecii,";, ;. ruprure of an arrery with loss of limb. Letier irom David Nathan, M.D.' Chief
ãin.À"i"t"gy, Children's Hospital Medical Çe1te1, Boston, to William Swift, Esq.' July ì8'igia t"" flle"âi Boston Univeisity Law Review). In addition, there is a possibility of skin
scarring. Levine ¿t al., suþra note 4, at 146.
In kiãney rransplanrs, ihe greatesr physical risk other than that due to anesthesia is the '
possibility thar the donor's reäaining'kiáney may someday fail. This risk appears to be so
il;ll ,hi tit inirrr"".. acruaries do"not coísidei individuals with one kidney a greater risk
than rhose with two. Harr v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 373,289 A.2d 386, 389 (Super. Ct.
igiZl. "fh. only real risk would be trauma to-the one reryai111S.ki^d1ey,^fut testimony
indicated that sulh trauma is extremely rare in civilian llfe." Id.,289 A'2d at 389. In over 20
years of experience with kidney t.un.þlun6, there has never been a reported case of total
í."J f"if"å in a donor throuþh t.aü-u or disease. Interview with Theodore Steinman'
fut.n, Oi...ro. of Dialysis Unitl Beth Israel Hospital, Boston, in Boston, Nov. 18, 1974.
Finally, there may be psychological costs to the donor. These include the effects of a fear
of operâtions, a fear of lôsing þart oI one's body and hostility toward.the recip^ie_nt.. Sre
iìr.åa.à,n, i.rtt-ur, & Muriay, Psychologic Considerations in the Selection of Kidney
TransplaniDonors, 129 Surg., óyne.'& Obstet.243,2a5-48 (1969); Kemph,_Psychotherapy
with p^atients Receiving Kidnéy Tiansplant, 124 Am. J. Psychiat. 623 (1967)' One adolescent
developed a depressiv"e reactiôn a mônth after a transplant operation, aPpårently due to a
fea. th'at he wai developing kidney disease. Bernstein & Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney-
Donor: The Right to Give,"l3l Am. J. Psychiat. 1338, 1340 (1974). There.is also the risk of
psych"t"gi.ut härm to the donor ifihe íecipient rejects the transplanted organ Òr^tissue.
ifu rnu! be especially harmful if the recipient dies a more ag-onizing death after an
,rtt.n..esifrll transplant than he would have otherwise. S¿¿ note 19 suþra'.
21 Studies of adült donors indicate that the main benefits are an increase in self-esteem, an
avoidance of the guilt feelings that might result if the donor did not particiPate, a¡d. the
sarisfacrion that fðllows froni the famiÍy's gratitude. See, e.g., Fellner & Marshall, Kidney
Donors-The Myth of Informed consenr, l2o Rm. J..Psychiat..1.2a5 (1970); s. schwartz,
The Activation of Personal Norms and Prosocial Behávior (unpublished paper delivered at
the Conference on Mechanisms of Psychological Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 1974). One stuáy fouñd that donors generally view the act of donation
"as a feat of heroism." Fellner & Marshall, suþa at 1249.
For discussion of the nature and likelihood of psychological benefits to older minor
donors see Bernstein & Simmons, szpra note 20, at 1539-41. Fór a similar discussion relating
to younger donors see Lewis, Kidney Donation by a ?-Year-O^1d.. l*"tt:?l Twin Child:
rsyfhotoigical, Legal and Ethical consiáerarions, l3J. Am. Acad. child Psychiat. 221,228-32
(léZ+). öne auth"ority on the psychological effectJof transplant o.p.erations expressed the
ùelief'that a young dónor may iuÉseque"ntly feel a personal rèsponsibility for. a donation or a
refusal ro dónateïespite thé fact thãt he'was noi consulted when the decision was made'
Telephone inìerview .tluith Sh"lo- Schwartz, Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, Dec. 13, 1974.
- -ä pàrents g.rr.iully can give effective consent for benefrcial medical treatment performed
on their child. W. Prosser, suþra note 5, at 103'
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medical treatment that will benefit the individual alone is a well-
established principle in our common law tradition.23 The requirement is
enforced by subjecting medical providers who act in the absËnce of con-
sent to liability for batrery.2a The underlying rheory is that the individual,
not society at large, should decide whether medical treatment is in his best
interests;-it is,"the parienr's right to make his decison in light of his own
individual value judgmenr."z5 The opinions of the docórs or of the
community at large are legally irrelevant.26 The requirement that consent
be rendered prior to medical treatment applies a fortiori in situations in
which the primary benefit from the medicãfprocedure will run to anorher
individual, as in the case of a transplant, or to society as a whole, as in the
case of medical experimentation. No matter how great the benefit to be
conferred nor how small the cost of conferring it, the procedure will
constitute a battery if performed without effective .onsent.
children generally are not competent to consent to medical treatment.A child's lack of capacity ro consent is predicated on the belief that,
because a child is inexperienced and immáture, he is incapable of decid-
ing what is in his own besr interesrs.2T In the typical case inwhich medical
treatment is likely to benefit the child, the best means of protecting the
child is to permit the child's parenrs ro consenr for the child. The pui"nt,
are probably best able to determine what is in the best interests of the
child and can generally be presumed to act to promote these interests.zs
Thus, when a child needs medical treatment, hiJ incompetence to consent
usually presents no problem because his parents are empowered to supply
the required consent.ze ^
Frowever, parents only have the power ço make critical decisions affect-
ing the welfare of their child in those contexts in which the parenrs are
23 See 2 | Ha¡ger & F.James, The Law of Torts g l7.t n.t5 (Supp. 196g); W. prosser,
suþra note 5, at l0l-04. There are, of course, situations in which socieìv decides that other
values outweigh the_ values_ protected by the requirement of conseít prior to medical
treatment. For example, mandatory vaccination laws háve been upheld against ðonstitutional chal-
Ieng_es. Jacobsen v. Massachus.rl., lgZ u.s. I I (1905). These iituatioäs, however, are largelyconfined to those in which the individual's failure to receive treatment would endanger-thá
community at largè and do not negate the traditional docrrine that each individual Ëas thepower to consent to medical treatment.
2a S¿¿ W._Prosset,1uþra note 5, at 102-06. Alternatively, it is possible to hold doctors who
proceed with medical treatment without procuring infoimed .ðn...rt liable for negligence.
see Traser & chadsey, Informed consént in Mãlpractice cases, 6 willamene i.jl ral( r 970).
2s Wilkinson v. Vesey, lt0 R.I. 608.624,29b A.Zd,676,687 (tg71).26 The keystone of this doctrin_e is every competent adult's right ìo foíego trearmenr, or
even cure, if it entails what for him ãre irìtolerable c,rnse"quences oi risks howeïer
unwise his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medicál profession, or even the
community.
Id., 295 A.2d ar 687.
27 SeeBonner v. Moran, 126 F.zd l2l (D.C. Cir. l94l); Rogers v. Sells, l?g Okla. 103,61
P.2d 1018 (1936); W. Prosser, suþra note 5, at 103.
. 
28 G.eneralþ,.a parent "has the strongest interest in the successful nurture and training of
th-e_child and in his protection from harm." Dobson, The Juvenile courr and pareãtalRights, 4 Fam. L.Q. 393. 396 (1970).
2e W. Prosser, suþra note 5, at 102-04.
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likely to be motivated to do what is best for the child. Under its parens
patriae power,3o the state has traditionally intervened in the parent-child
relationship when the parents are not acting to further the child's best
interests.sl
There has been a discernible trend toward the use of the parens patriae
power by the courts in the field of medical care for children. Many cases
involve parents who refuse to consent to medical treatment for their
children on religious grounds.sz When the life of the child was im-
mediately threatened, the courts have used or upheld the use of available
statutory procedures to deprive the parents of custody temporarily in
order to approve the treatment.ss In addition, the courts have overriden
the parents in cases involving vaccination,3a removal of tonsils and
adenoids,ss and other medical procedures to cure nonlife-threatening
problems.s6 In contrast, courts have acceded to the parents' wishes in
refusing treatment for conditions such as rickets,sT a disfigured arm,38 a
speech impedimentse and the need for a spinal fusion operation.ao In
each of the latter cases, however, the evidence indicated both that the
effrcacy or safety of the proposed treatment was reasonably open to
question and that the parents sincerely believed that the decision was in
the best interests of the child.
30 The doctrine of parens patriae is that the state is the ultimate guardian of every child.
Under this doctrine, which is predicated in part on the belief that there is a correlation
between the welfare of the child and the welfare of society, the state has not only the right
but also the duty both to establish standards for the care of children and to interfere with
the parent-child relationship when necessary to ensure that those standards are met. Dob-
son., supra note 28, at 396.
31 There are many situations in which the state has intervened to promote a child's
interests. When necessary, the state has permanently deprived parents of custody of their
child in order to protect the child from abusive treatment or the consequences of neglect. See
gmerall2 Paulsen, The Legal Framework for the Protection of Children, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
679,693-703 (1966). Even apparently well-intentioned parents have been temporarily de-
prived of custody in instances in which they were perceived not to be acting in the child's
best interests.
32 See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1.967);In
re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972); In rø Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918,
328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
33 People ex rel. Wallace v. LaBrenz, 4lI lll. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. deni.ed,344 U.S.
82a (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.463, l8I A.2d75l,cert. d¿ni¿d,371 U.S.890 (1962);
Hoener v. Bertinato,6T NJ. Super.5l7, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 196l);
Application of Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Heinemann's Appeal,96 Pa. l12 (1880); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
3a Mannis v. State exrel. Dewitt School Dist. No. 1,240 Ark.42,398 S.W.2d 206 (1966).
3õ In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (lowa 1972).
38 In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (disfigure-
ment); In r¿ Carstairs, I l5 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952) (emotional illness); In re
Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S. 624 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. l94l) (deformity of foot
resulting from polio); In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950) (emotional
illness).
37 In re:Iuttendario, 2l Pa. Dist. 561 (Dist. Ct. t91l).
38 In re Hudson, l3 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
3e Inre Seiferth,309N.Y.80, l27 N.E.zd820(1955);Inre Frank,4lWash.2d294,248
P.2d 553 (1952).
ao In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A2d 387 (1972).
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-. 
Thê situation presented by a transplant involving siblings is a compel-
ling one_for taking the power of decision away from the parents of the
prospective minor donor. one may seriously question wheiher an opera-
tion to remove an organ or tissue will be iñ the best interests oi the
prospective minor donor,ar and the child's parents assuredly are not in a
position in which they are likely to be motivated solely to do what is best
for the prospective donor.
In a bone marrow or kidney transplant case involving sibling donor and
recipient, the parents necessarily are confronted with a painful dilemma.
Although they have a desperarely ill child who may die ii no transplanr is
performed, and although they wish to do whatever may saue his life,
presumably they do nor wanr to injure their healthy child, the prospective
donor. Generally, the only possible resolution of this conflict for the
parents will be to attempr to save the life of the sick child by consenting to
the minor donor's participation because of the comparatively minimal iisk
to the healthy child.
If the decision whether the minor donor should participate were made
by the parents, no forces outside the family unit would restrain the
parents from risking the health of the donor for the benefit of the
reciþient. Absent official intervenrion, the only persons outside the family
unit with whom the parents are likely to consult are the doctors. Because
the doctors by this time will have made the medical judgment that the
potential benefits from the operation outweigh rhe costs, they will proba-
bly favor proceeding with the operation.a2 Moreover, there are several
factors operating on a subconscious level that may prevent doctors from
exercising an entirely objective judgment on the decision to recommend
the transplant operation. A successful transplant operation obviously
gives the medical transplant team a deep sense of accomplishment. Even
if an operation fails, the team must realize that it has made every ef-
fort possible to save the life of the recipient. Finally, the performance of
transplant operations is important to medical research.a3
Even if the court proceedings generally will result in authorization of
the operation, the requirement of court approval serves a critical func-
tion. Although not the only condition for proceeding, as a practical
. 
tt lor example, in_Camitta v. Fager, Eq. No. 78-l7l (Mass., Sept. 5, lgZS), the prospectivedonor's guardian ad litem contendéd that-the minor donor's menial state-áharacìerirèd as a
combination of mild retardation and schizophrenia-precluded the realization of any
psychological benefi ts.
a2 This article is not suggesting that the doctors do not consider the effect of the
operation on the prospective donor. in deciding whether to recommend that the transplant
should proceed. The opposite is rhe case. In" many hospitals the practice is to givå the
prospective donor a battery of psychological tests. For disêussion of ihe Minnesota"practice
see Bernstein & Simmons, søpra r'ote 20, at 1338-3g. see also Lewis, suþra note 21, at 222,
227-28. once the doctors have determined that the operation should o'ccur, however, they
ut:.1. j likely to encourage parents to question that iecommendation seriously.a3 Most bone marrow transplants are-performed under the auspices of reséarch grantsfrom the National Institutes of Health. lnterview with Dr. David Nathan, supra no:te 17.
Although..kidney transplants are no longer "experimental" from the recipient's point of
view, additional scientific knowledge may be gained from each operation.^
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matter, the consent of the parentsaa and the doctors is necessary. By
removing the decision from a context in which all parties favor the
operation and by impressing upon both the parents and the doctors the
gravity of the decision, the court proceedings increase the possibility that
either the pa.rents or the doctors will decline to consent in those cases in
which there is substantial doubt whether an operation would be in the
best interests of the prospective donor.as This consideration constitutes a
strong argument against a proposal to remove the decision from the
courts and place it either entirely in the hands of the parents or in the
hands of a nonjudicial tribunal that would resolve the matter through
informal, nonadversary proceedings.a6
The practice of court authorization has the potential for ensuring that
the substantive interests of the prospective minor donor will be respected
and considercd before he participates'in the operation, just as those of an
adult would be.a7 Whether the practice succeeds in attaining this objective
is a function of two factors: the substantive rule that the court applies in
deciding whether to authorize the donation and the procedural
safeguards that are afforded the prospective donor. The Massachusetts
practice has been inadequate in both respects. The Massachusetts courts
have not consistently applied a standard for authorizing transplants that
provides the donor with the protection that the system was presumably
designed to afford, and, in most of the cases, they have permitted the
parties to structure the court proceedings in such a way that there is no
assurance that the donor's interests will be represented at all, much less
aa In a case in which both the donor and the recipient are minors, it is hard to conceive of
the operation proceeding without the parents' consent. Under traditional common law
principles, the parents would have to consent to both the donor and the recipient's participa-
tion in the procedure. S¿¿ note 29 supra. Conceivably, a court could temporarily deprive the
parents of custody of both children-rather than of only the donor-and consent on behalf
of both children. However, there is no reported case in which a court has done so.
a5 At least one judge who has handled minor transplant donor cases conducts the pro-
ceedings in a manner designed to impress upon the parents the gravity of their. decision.
Interview with Judge Mary Fitzpatrick, suþra note 19.
a6 The appeal of such a tribunal is that the informal proceedings would be much less
painful for the family members. The tribunal could hear the cases within the hospital
setting, without resort to adversary proceedings. The expertise that such a body would
develop arguably would enable it not only to hear and decide cases expeditiously but would
also enhance its ability to refine the standard that it was instructed to apply.
However, formal proceedings encourage the parents and doctors to reflect seriously with
respect to whether the transplant will benefit the donor. If these matters arè handled
informally within the hospital, the concerned parties will treat the matter far less seriously.
There is a real danger that such a tribunal would be dominated by the hospital and develop
a bias toward the hospital's position. Moreover, the need for expertise is greatest not in the
tribunal, but in the representative ofthe interests ofthe donor. Ifhe understands the critical
medical and psychological facts and has sufficient time to investigate and prepare evidence,
there may not be any need for expertise in the tribunal. The medical and psychological
expertise of the tribunal is arguably far less important than its sensitivity to the ethical and
legal questions.
a? The adult's interests are at least in theory respected and considered through the
requirement of informed, voluntary consent. S¿¿ notes 23-26 and accompanying textsupra^
Absent a requirement of court authorization, the question whether the child's interests were
adequately considered could be raised only in a battery action brought after the operation.
i
I
Íl
{
{
f
iF
?
t
&t
,*
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM MINOR DONO,RS 169
)ssary. By
favor the
¡ctors the
bility that
e cases in
be in the
rstitutes a
from the
or in the
: through
rring that
respected
rose of an
r objective
applies in
,rocedural
sachusetts
rtts courts
rlants that
resumably
nitted the
here is no
much less
¡ conceive of
rommon law
t's participa-
'deprive the
nt on behalf
one so.
rcts the Pro-
,eir decision.
¡e much less
the hospital
body would
ly but would
eriously with
are handled
ess seriously.
and develop
:st not in the
is the critical
rre evidence,
:sychological
e ethical and
through the
rg text supra.
nterests were
e operation.
r
t
-I
adequately. In examining the system in operation, this article will offer
proposals for legislative reform, both with respect to the substantive rule
that should be applied and with respect to ensuring adequate represenra-
tion of the prospective donor's intèrests.
III. T*'¡ Besrs upoN wHrcH TneNspr-eNTS ARE Aursonrzrr
- 
Although the justices of the supreme Judicial courr have issued 22decrees authorizing transplant operations,ihey have not yet articulated a
consistent standard for ascertaining the conditions under which such
authorizations are appropriate.a8 In the vast majority of Massachusetts
c1s9s, the justices have nor clearly articulated the iegal theory upon
which their decrees have been based. They have merely authorized-the
operations after stating various findings of fact as to the extraordinary
benefits to the recipient from the proposed rransplant, the minimal risks
to_the donor, the parents'consent, the donor's consent and, usually, the
existence of some benefit to the donor.ae The reason for this approach is
easily understood; an examination of Massachusetts decisions that have
attempted to articulate a principled standard reveals that each of the
theories that a court might use to justify its intuitive conclusions presents
difficult problems.
There are three basic theories upon which the supreme Judicial court
has relied. under the first, the "bàst interests" test, the colrt authorizes
the transplant if it determines that participation in the operation wìll
result in a net benefit to the prospective donor.5o The Massachusetts court
appears to have followed the best inrerests approach in almost all cases.
under the second theory, which was initially applied ín Nøthøn u.
Farinelli,sr the court characterized its duty not as one of deciding itself
whether the operation should go forward but rather as one of revìewing
the parents' weighing of the relative costs and benefits of the operation tõ
both children.sz under the third theory, the court determinès whether
the minor is sufficiently mature so that his consent to the transplant
operation may be deemed effective. This approach was utilized in Rap-
þeþort a. stott.'' Each theory will be examined in rerms of a court's abiliiy
to administer it to protect the substantive interests of the prospective
donor.
a8 The Suffolk. Couruy Probate Court has also decided a number of cases authorizing
lransp]yt gpgrations.8.g., Durant v. Santo, Eq. No. l0l7 (p. Ct., Suffolk County, Mass]Sept. 17, 1974)' However, the hospital involvedlsuccessfully moved to have the records of
these cases impounded. This impoundment makes it impossible to discuss the rationale
utilized in these cases in supporr of authorization.
as See, e.g., Nathan v. Meekens, Eq. No. 74-109 (Mass.,June 14, 1974); Camitta v. Alcorn,
Eq_. \o, 74-23 (Mass., Feb. 14, lg74); Nathan v. Clark, Eq. No. 73-71 (Mass., Apr. 12, 1973).50 This test was first used in the lg57 kidney transplant cases. Foster v. Harrison, Eq. ño.
6867.4 (Mass.,Aug.30,. 1957);.Huskey v. Harrison, iiq. No.6g666 (Mass., Rug.3ô, t'SS7¡;
Masden v. Harrison, slip op.5r Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass., July 3, l97a) (all citations are to slip opinion).52 Id. at 10.
53 Civil No. J 74-57 (Mass., Aug. 28, lg74) (all citations are to slip opinion).
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A. The Best Interests Test
IJnder this theory, a court will authorize the donation only if it deter-
mines that participation in the operation will promote the best interests of
the prospeótive dònor. Courts traditionally employ this test, or the closely
related substituted judgment test,54 whenever they are called upon to
make decisions for incompetent individuals. They have used it extensively
in authorizing beneficial medical treatment for children whose parents
refuse to consent for religious reasons.ss
A court ordinarily will authorize medical treatment of a minor only if it
finds that the operation is likely to result in a net physical benefit to the
child.56 A transþlant donor, of course, does not benefit physically from
participation in the transplant operation. In the transplant context' there-
io.., th" decision must turn on proof that the psychological benefits that
will flow to the donor as a result of the operation outweigh the possible
physical harm.57 Few situations provide the opportunity for the type of
iompelling tesrimony on this point that was given in the Kentucky case of
Strunk a. 5tuunh.58 In that case, the court authorized a kidney transplant
from a mentally retarded 2l -year-old to his brother largely because of the
overwhelming psychiatric evidence that under the circumstânces the
5a Usually thought to be the creation of l,ord Eldon in Etc þa'rte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep.
878 (Ch. 1816), ihis doctrine empowers a court of equity to authorize gifts from an
incompetent's estate on the sole ground that the incompetent would choose to do so if he
were competent. Courts have traditionally used this test in contexts involving_ leal o¡ p.e^r-
sonal proþerty. See generally Note, Substitution of Judgment Doctrine and Making of Gifts
from ân Incompetent's Estate, 7 Real Prop. Probate & Trust J' 479 (1972). In applying the
best interests test, a court attempts to evaluate objectively what is best for the person
involved. Under the substituted judgment test, the court, in effect, is determining the
subjective question of what this þerson would decide to be in his best interests were he
competent.J?¿ re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415 (1928); Inre lleming, 175 Misc. 851, l9 N.Y.S.Zd 234
(Sup. Ct. 1970). In the case of a minor donor, there is no prior period of competency uPon
whièh to base a determination of the donor's altruism. Therefore, in applying the substi-
tuted judgment test in a case involving a minor, a court is simply applying a form of the
best interèsts test. It must make a decision based upon its perception of what a reasonable
person would do if he were in the minor's position. The two reported transplant cases in
't hich the courrs have purported to use the substituted judgment test in reaching their
decision are Stmnk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d V5 (Ky. 1969), and Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn.
Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. CT' 1972). For discussion of the use of the substituted
judgment rationale in transplant cases see Lausier v. Pescinski, No. 668, at 4-5 (Wis., Mar.4,
1975); Note, Spare Parts from Incompetents: A Problem of Consent, 9 J. Fam. L. 309,
310-ll (1969);-74 Dick. L. Rev. 530 (i970); l0 Washburn LJ. rb7,160 (1970).
5s S¿¿ text accompanying notes 32-33 suþra; cf. Larsen, Child Neglect in the Exercise of
Religious Freedom, 32 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 283 (1954).
56 See, e.g., Peopleøx rel.Wallace v. Labrenz,4ll Ill.6l8, 104 N.E'2d 769,cert. d'enied,344
U.S. 824 (iSSZ) (btooa transfusion to infant); State v. Perricone, ST NJ.463, 181 A.2d 751,
cert. dmied,371 U.S. 890 (1962) (same);12 re Clark,2l Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P.
1962) (same).
57 The early Massachusetts cases were reportedly the first cases to treat purely psychologi-
cal or emotionaì benefrt as sufflcient to satisfy the requirements of the test. S¿¿ Cr;rran, suþa
note 2, at 892-94; Savage, Organ Transplantation with an Incompetent Donor: Kentucky
Resolves the Dilemma óî St ink u. Strunh, 58 Ky. LJ. 129, 136 (1970); Note, Equity-
Transplants-Power of Court to Authorize Removal of Kidney from Mental Incompetent
for Transplantation into Brother, 16 Wayne L. Rev. 1460, 1464-67 (1970t'
58 445 S.W.2d 1a5 (Ky. 1969).
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ORGAN TRANSPIÁNTS FROM MINOR DONOÃS t7t
death of the donee would have had an extremely traumatic effect upon
the donor.se
In the Massachusetts cases, the determination of net benefit to the
donor has turned upon similar psychiatric testimony.60 Perhaps because
of the lack of genuinely adversary proceedings in most of these cases,6r
the testimony seems quite contrived. It appears that the medical witnesses
are consciously providing the court with the necessary words to satisfy
the psychological benefit finding required as a condition to granting the
requested relief.62 The sense of contrivance is strongest when the donor,
as in some recent cases,63 is too young to have developed the kind of deep
ties with his sibling that the resrimony suggesrs. Indeed, in Massachusetts
cases in which guardians ad litem for the donors have explicitly adopted
an adversary approach, the testifying psychiatrists have admitted that any
testimony that they were prepared to give regarding future psychological
benefit or detriment to the donor would be highly speculative.Ga The
uncertain quality of the psychiatric testimony preserits the court with a
difficult problem. If there is no stronger evidence regarding porential
psychological benefrt than "speculative" psychiatric restimony, it is doubt-
ful whether a court can administer the best interests test so as to provide
the prospective donor with the prorecrion that the proceeding is intended
to afford.
In Nathan a. Farinelli, which involved a six-year-old donor, the Mas-
sachusetts court refused to apply the best interests test because of the
admittedly speculative quality of the psychiatric resrimony. The cour.r's
decision not to apply the best interests resr may be justified because of the
present inadequacies of its application, However, an examination of the
tests utilized in Farinelli and Raþþeþort u. Stott suggesrs that rhe besr
interests test nevertheless may offer the only means by which the legal
system's apparent objectives in this area may be satisfred.
B. Reuiew of Parental Decision
ln Farinelli, the Supreme Judicial Court did not apply the best interests
test because it believed that any findings concerning the psychological
benefits of the transplant operation to the minor donor would be unduly
speculative.6s The court preferred to treat the parents as having the
"primary right and 'responsibility for deciding" whether one sibling
i
I
J
f
5s Id. at 146.
Eo See, e.g., Maçden u. Harrison,.discussed in note 14 suþra.
61 S¿¿ text accompanying notes 713-33 inþa.62 The snunk case has been criticized for this,reason. see, e.g., Note, suþto, note 52, at
1464-65; Note, suþra nate 54,9 J. Fam. L. ar 315.
-lt E.g. Nathan v. Farinelli, slip op. (six-year-old donor); Camitta v. Alcorn, Eq. No. 24-23(Mas1., Fe-b. 14,-1974) (four-year-old,donor); Camitta v. Schillinger, Eq. No. Z+-lB 1Mass.,
Jaltr 31, 1974) (five- and eight-year-old prospective donors; recipieît lessìhan one yeai old).'
-.64 See Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J ?4-t09 1Mass., Oct. +, tg7+); Nathan v. Farinelii,slip op.
65 Slip op' at 7.
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should donate an organ or tissue to another and to permit the parents to
make a decision by weighing the interests of each child.66 However, the
court considered it necèssary to exercise its equity power to review the
parents' decision in such cases
because of the possibility of a conflict between the.ir responsibility.for
the care and cuitody of ithe recipientl, and their similar responsibility
for fthe donor] .. í. ¡f1ne saftiguard of judicial review is necessary
because of the potential tempta-tlons resulttng lrom the burlt-rn
conflict of [the pàrents'] position'67
The court's review of the parental decision demonstrates that the court
did not consider its primary duty to be protection of the prospective
donor. Rarher, the coirt weighed the interests of both children' On the
one hand, the court assessed
the nature and urgency of lthe recipient's] physical condition, his
need for the transp-lanti the probable benefrt to him fiom the trans-
ptotrt, tn. probablê risks or cottsequences to him if the transplanta-
tion ir wiùrhetd, and the availa6ility and efficacy of alternative
methods of treatment for his condition'68
On the other hand, it considered the donor's "physical condition, the
nature and extent of her physical participation in the transplant, and the
probable and possible risks and consequences to her by reason of her
participation."6e
' Thf emphasis on rhe need for judicial review because of the pare_nts'
conflict of interests with respect to their two children seems at first
inconsistent with the court's approval of parental balancing of the in-
terests of both children. As discussed above,7o one of the primary reasons
that parental consent for the prospective minor donor is ineffective under
the best interests test is the parents' conflict of interests. Such a conflict in
motivation, however, upp.uit to be inherent in the Farinelli rationale' The
parenrs are empowered specifically to make their decision based on an
àssessment of the interests of both children.?r In effect, they are given the
authority to sacrifice the interests of the prospective donor if they reason-
ably conclude that the costs to him are outweighed by the potential
benefits to the recipient.
Nevertheless, even under the Farinelli utilitarian standard, in which the
parents initially resolve the conflict of interests, there are sound reasons
why judicial review should be retained. The extreme need of the recipient
66 Id. at 10. Several courts in otherjurisdictions also have authorized such donations on
the basis of parental consent that was itself based on a family cost-benefit standard. See, e'g.,
Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972);1ø r¿ Bostrom, Eq. No,.
49385 (Cir. Ct., Montgomeiy Co.tttty, Md., June 7, 1974); Smith v. lmitn' rq'-f9:139]9(Cir. Ci., Montgomery"Couniy, Md., july 19,1972); In re Bachman, Fid. No. 20828 (Cir. Ct.,
Fairfax County, Va., Aug. I, 1974).
67 Slip op. at 10.
68 Id,. at ll.
8s Id.
70 S¿¿ text accompanying notes 4l'43 suþra.
7r Slip op. at 10.
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ORGAN TRANSPI- NTS FROM MINOR DONORS 173
renders suspect the parents' ability to assess objectively the interests of the
prospective donor-specifically, to give proper weight to rhe risks of
injury arising from the donation. Moreover, there is a danger that the
parents may be particularly insensitive to the risks to be incurred by a
disfavored donor or particularly impressed with the benefits to be gained
by an especially favored recipient.
The Farinelli court appeared to recognize these considerations when it
stated that it. would exercise its review power for the purpose of ensuring
that the parental decision is "fair and reasonable."T2 The court apparently
intended to ensure that the extreme need of the recipient did not lead the
parents to impose risks upon the donor that the court would not consider
"reasonable" in relation to the potential benefrts to the recipient. Al-
though the court did not indicate what it meant by the word "fair," it may
have used the term to express the requirement that the parental decision
be made in a manner that did not differentiate between the donor and
the recipient on the basis of their relative status in the family.?3
Neveitheless, the Farinelli decision is disturbing when one cclnsiders the
factors that parents and courts, deliberately or unconsciously, may include
in the balancing process. There may be cases in which a transplant
operation will provide an important medical advance that will benefit
society at large. Moreover, in a case in which the prospective donor is
mentally retarded and his sibling is perceived to be a potentially contribut-
ing member of society, there will always be a temptation to weigh the
relative social "worth" of the individuals. Authorization of organ or tissue
donations on a basis other than the furtherance of the donor's best
interests may lead ineluctably to inclusion of such societal values in the
balance.Ta
72 Id,. at ll.
73 This meaning of the term is suggested by the concept ofjustice as fairness. See gennally
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (197I). This concept is directly applicable to the transplant
situation. For example, in one of the Massachusetts cases,
[t]here seemed to be three possible donors: a retarded l3-vear-old sibline and two
normal ones. The parents wånted the retarded child to be the donor and *refused to
consider the I l-yeai-old (their only daughter) for this . . . . Appropriare rests confirmed
the retarded chíld to be'the only'histoËompatible donor.
t.evine et al., suþra note 4, at 147. Were the dËcision to have the mentally retarded child bethe donor made partially on the basis of his retarded condition, one might question its
fairness. Even when such obvious unfairness is not present, the court might wish to inquire
into the parental decision in order to examine the extent to which the parents were making
the decision on grounds that would produce the same result if the roles of the children were
reversed.
7a Presumably it was this concern that prompted Justice Steinfeld's dissent i¡ Strunk v.
Strunk:
Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a government which, to the
everlasting shame of its citizeñs, embarked on a program of -genocide and experimenta-
tion with human bodies I have been more troubled in reacñing a decision ín this case
than in any other. My sympathies and emotions are torn betweeñ a compassion to aid an
ailing youirg man and'a cluty to lully protect unfortunate members óf society.
445 S.W.2d at 149.
To hold that committees, guardians or courts have such awesome power even in the
persuasive case before us, õould establish legal precedent, the dire iesult of which we
cannot fathom. Regretfully I must say no. -
Id. at l5l.
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The most troublesome aspect of the Farinelli standard, however, is its
fundamental inequity. Society does not require adults to donate organs or
tissue whenever the likelihood of benefit to the recipient appears to
outweigh the cost to the donor. Why then should a parent be permitted to
require a child to participate as a donor in a transplant operation without
proof that doing so would promote the donor's best interests simply
because the cost to the donor is deemed acceptable?7s.
A parent, of course, has the power to make some purely utilitarian
decisions that will benefit the family unit to the detriment of one child,
and the law recognizes this power in a variety of situations.T6 Tort law, for
example, recognizes that a parent may consider the influence of the
example upon other siblings in deciding how severely to punish a child
for disobedience.TT In addition, parents are entitled to a minor child's
services and earnings while the child lives with and is supported by
them.78 Under this principle, parents presumably have the power to
require one child to seek employment to help pay the medical bills
incurred for a chronically ill second child.
Yet some interests of the child traditionally have been deemed so
fundamental that the parents have been denied the power to invade them
even when doing so would benefit the entire family, except upon a
showing that the best interests of the child would be promoted. For
example, the general rule with respect to the property of a minor is that the
property that a child acquires. except as compensation for services rend-
ered by him, "belongs to him absolutely, and the parent, as such, has no
75 One possible source of analogous authority for justifying parental decision making on a
cost-benefit basis in transplant casés is the line of decisions that have established an "incom-
plete privilege" to invade the interests of others on the ground of "private necessity."
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., I09 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 8l
Vt. 471,71 A. 188 (1908). The existence of this incomplete privilege has been recognized by
the Second Restatement of Torts $$ 197-98 (1965), as well as by commentators.8.g., I F.
Harper & F.James, suþra, note 23, $$ 2.43-.44.9ee generally Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to
Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 307
( I 926). It could be argued on the authority of these cases that, when the need to save the life
of the recipient far outweighs the relatively minor risks to the donor, the recipient or
someone acting on his behalf has a privilege to transplant the organs or tissue involved.
The application of this line of authority to the transplant cases would raise a number of
problems. It would require that no distinction be drawn between invasions of property
interests, such as in Ploof andVincent, and invasions of the person. Moreover, it would seem
to create an obligation on the part of the recipient to compensate the donor for any injury
sustained by the invasion. S¿¿ Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., suþra at 459, 124 N.W. at
222. Finally, the application of the "incomplete privilege" theory to prospective minor
donors would be grossly unfair unless it were applicable to adults as well. Indeed, the theory
is not restricted to family members; its use to justify the taking of organs or tissue on the
grounds of necessity would entitle any person to take parts of the body of another if there
were an acceptable balance of benefrts and costs.
76 American jurisprudence recognizes a broad "natural right" in parents to determine the
upbringing of their children. Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justification and
Limitations, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1383, 1384-85 (1974); see Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
77 Restatement of Torts $ 150 (1934).
78 J. Madden, The Law of Persons and Domestic Relations g 120, at 403 (1931).
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ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM MINOR DONORS 175
claim to it."7e Massachusetts not only has recognized this doctrine but also
has extended it. The Supreme Judicial Courr has held that a bounty paid
to a minor for enlisting in the army is the property of the minor, rather
than earnings, because it was "given to the recruit for the purpose of
inducing him personally to undertake a service of an arduous and
hazardous nature."8o Accordingly, his father lacked the power or author-
ity to use or spend any part of it.
It seems incongruous for Massachusetts to protect vigorously a minor's
property rights yet acquiesce in a parental decision to authorize an organ
or tissue transplant. In refusing to authorize a kidney transplSnt opera-
tion, a Louisiana court noted that its law affords a minor unqualified
protection against intrusion into mere property rights and concluded, "[it]
is inconceivable to us that [our law should afford] less protection to a
minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to rhe exrent
of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor."8l
The court in Farinelli, cited only one case ro supporr the proposition that
parents could authorize an operation not of therapeutic benefit to the
child involved.s2 That case, Bonner u. Moran,83 involved a l5-year-old boy
who had willingly donated skin to his cousin for a skin graft to relieve her
from the crippling effects of extensive burns. In a subsequent action by
the child's parent, the court held that the consent of the parent, which
had not been obtained, was necessary to authorize thê minor's participa-
tion.sa Although the court did indicate that parental consent would be
sufficient for authorization,ss the facts of the case did not require a ruling
on this question.sG Moreover, the Bunner case differs in at least oné
important respect from cases such as Farinelli: the recipient of the dona-
tion in Bonner was not another child of the parent. The conflict of
interests on the part of the parent was not present as it is in transplant
cases involving immediate family members. There was, therefore, a basis in
Bonner for continuing the presumption that the parental decision would
be made in the donor's best interests-a factor that is not present in
intrafamily transplant cases. Thus, even the dictum in Bonner does not
support the proposition that parents may require one sibling to partici-
pate in an operation for the benefit of another.
Førinelli permits parents, subject to court review, to impose an obliga-
tion upon children that society does not impose upon adults. It is plain
that our society is not yet prepared to require adults to donate organs or
t' Id. $ 132, at 439 (foornore omitted).
80 Banks v. Conant, 96 Mass. ( l4 Allen) 497 , 498 (1867); accord., Taylor v. Mechanics Sav.
Bank, 97 Mass. (14 Allen) 345 (1867).8r In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. App. 1973).
82 Slip op. at 4.
83 126 F.2d l2l (D.C. Cir. 1941).
8a Id. at 123. Another case frequently cited with Bonncr as authority lor this proposition is
Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. &'C. 309 (C.P. 1933) (dictum).85 126 F.2d at 123 (dictum).
86 See Capron, Legal Considerations Affecting Clinical Pharmacological Studies in Chil-
dren, 2l Clinical Research l4l, 143 (1972).
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tissue when the benefits to the recipient appear to outweigh the costs to
the donor.87 The Fari,nelli utilitarian approach is, therefore, inconsistent
with a sincere desire to afford minors and other incompetents the protec-
tion from potentially harmful medical procedures that adults enjoy.e8 The
irony implicit in any standard that imposes such an obligation upon
minárs and other incompetents but not upon adults is that its use would
take advantage of a juáicial proceeding designed to protect the most
vulnerable in our society in oider to exploit them in a way that adults
cannot be exploited.
C. The Minor Donor's Consent as Elfectiue
In Raþþeport a. Stott, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ap-
proved å-minor's donation of bone marrow on the express ground that
ih. l7-y.ut-old donor was "capable of cons'enting to the proposed proce-
dure so as to prevent the creation of liability therefor."se At least one
commentator hãs suggested that consent of the donor be the sole criterion
for authorizing donation in cases involving minors.eo For several reasons'
this approach io the minor donor problem is not a justifrable alternative
to the best interests test.
One objection to this approach is that consent would be effective in only
a few casãs. In S/o/ô the donor was 17, and the psychiatrist who examined
him concluded: "[H]e should be allowed ro make his own independent
decision about any matters affecting his welfare."er Such a finding could
not be made in many cases involving minor donors. The same commen-
tator. who suggested that the donor's consent be the sole legal question in_
rransplanrs iãvolving minors also argued that children under the age of
conscription or marriage should never be donors.ez However, such a rule
is undésirably rigid. The law should not deny absolutely the life-saving
potential of transplants to individuals for whom the only suitable prospec-
iive donors ure yorrtrg minors, especially in cases in which there is an
overwhelming probability that the prospective donor would consent were
he old enough to make an informed and considered decision.
- Th. D"p-'*
experiments involving human subjects exemplify the current concern for the rights of the
individual. In additiõn to requiring an ass,rmnce that the benefits of the experimen^tal
activity warrant the risks to the subjects, the regulations require elaborate procedures for
.tr.rr.ing that consent is informed ánd voluntary. See 45 C.F.R. $$ 46.I-.22 (1974).
8s Cf. Lausier v. Pescinski, No. 668 (Wis., Mar. 4, 1975):
An "incomoetent narticularlv should have his own interests protected. Certainly no
advantage'should be taken óf ni-. In the absence of real con_sént^on his part, and in a
situation"where no benefit to him has been established, we fail to find an;'authority for
the county court, or this court, to approve this operation
Id. at 5 (invólving requesr to authorize kidney transplant from 39-year-old mental incompe-
tent to his sister).
8s Slip op. at 3.
no Daibé, Transplantation-Acceptability of Procedures and the Required Legal Sanc-
rions, in Ethics in Medical Progress: With Special Reference to Transplantation 188, 199 (G'
Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor eds. 1966).
e1 Report of Psychiatric Interview at 2.
e2 Daube, suþra note 90, at 198-99.
t
i
t
r
i
t
I
'r
.,j
*
i::
{
,,ì
::
t:
.::lì
::1
Jì
'*
4
fi
tñ
*i
#
*t
s
g:l
*1ã
{
f
t
{
I
t
I
t
Í
t
ft
r*
:f
i', I
I
t
Ill
4,$
ry
tweigh the costs to
efore, inconsistent
petents the protec-
ldults enjoy.88 The
r obligation upon
that its use would
protect the most
a way that adults
[udicial Court ap-
lpress ground that
re proposed proce-
)r."8s At least one
re the sole criterion
'or several reasons,
stifiable alternative
be effective in only
rist who examined
own independent
ch a finding could
'he same commen-
le legal question in
L under the age of
)wever, such a rule
tely the life-saving
y suitable prospec-
which there is an
,ould consent were
decision.
ions regarding funded
:n for the rights of the
r of the experimental
rborate procedures for
46.t-.22 (1974).
rtected- Certainlv no
on his part, u.rd i.t u
ind any authority for
ar-old mental incompe-
Required Legal Sanc-
plantation 188, 199 (G.
I
i
{
I
i
i¡l
ORGAN TRANSPIÁNTS FROM MINOR DONORS 177
An alternative approach would be to abolish the status of minority
altogether.es Under thi, upptouch, "empirical" differences among chil-
drei would be the sole bãiis for making individual exceptions to the
general rule of competence.ea The First Rèstatement of Torts supported
J,r.h a subjective standard of competence to consent to intentional inva-
sions of pärsonal interests.es However, the Second Restatement aban-
doned this approach because of its widespread nonacceptance by courts.eG
Judicial or tàgirtutiue acrion lowering the age of consent generally from
thä present agã of 18 appears highþ unlikely. Nevertheless, a special
rule'loweringih. ug" of ìãnsent for donation of organs or-tissue might
be consider.d. so-" jurisdictions have granted minors the power to
consent to blood tranifusionseT and to other types of medical proce-
dures.es Michigan now has a statute permitting a minor of 14 years or
older to give e-ffective consen! to a transplant donatio-" l1 u member of
his immeáiate family.ee Because of the nature of the decision to serve as
a donor in a transplant operation, however, such a special rule seems
inappropriate.
Ãìp..iut rule lowering the age for a minor's consent to organ or tlssue
.donatìon could be justified ".tty if there were sound reasons'to believethat minors are more competent to make this decision than other deci-
sions for which.o-p.t"rr.ábegins at age 18. However, such decisions are
less likely to be wiihin the cõmpetenie of children. The medical and
-
sa Id,. ln the specific *u-of consent to medical .ui., .o*. courts have developed a
.,mature minor,' mle, the effect of which "is to allow a subjective- appraisal of at least some
."..r-i" *fti.n the physiciÃ p.o...d with nonemergency riedical cãie fo^r minors with only-
the oatienr's consent." See iennally Wadlington, iüittois and Health Care: The Age of
ö."",i."i, ii-org"ãå. nãlr r-i. rrsl 1l? (197'3). At least one state has codified the "mature
minor,, subjective approach Ëy providing that consent is effective from "[a]ny unemanci-
put.d 
-inoî of .ufn.ì..,t inrJíig!".. to r-i.rderstand and apprecìate the,consequen.-tt.9f^*:
;-p";;J surgical o. -.¿ì.ui tåatment or procedures . . . ." l'lit.. Code Ann. $ 4l-41-3(h)(1g72). In all of the..mature minor" cases, iro*.u.., a-preliminary determination was made
that,.[t]he treatment *u. ,rrrd..tuk.n fo. ti¡e benefit of ìhe minor rather than a third party'"
Wadlington, suPra at 7I9.
e5 Restatement of Torts $ 59, comment ¿ at lll (1934)'
e6 Savage, suþra note 57, at 134.
rt ¿n.,'fla. 3tut. ¿rr.,.ï iO-S-2-l tS"."s Supp. 1P74) (any person l7 years of ag-e-or older
may give blood in a noncompensatory program wrthout pá.êntal authorization); N.Y. Pub.
Heåtür Law $ 3123 (McKinney Supp' 1974) (same)'^-;;-C.c-1"ä. 
Stut. Àntt- $ iO-b-r- r' (tO7l¡ 1""y P.ttsgt i: competent to consent to treatment
of u.r.1Éal disease); Ui.t,. Stut. n"". $ tS.itSi(i) (tSZtl (a minor may give valid consent to
;*";;;;i". ánrg addiction). An Oregon statute-provides thar "a minor l5 years of age or
older may give consent;i".pi.i ca?e, medical^or surgical diagnosis or treatment by a
ohvsician . ... without the consent ot a parent or guardian.; Ore. Rèv. Stat. $ 109'640 (1974)'Ëiäìåiä';;; ä,Ëä;i;;;;; *'ro y.u,, for .'surgicat, T:d,_.1r oI q:l,ul treatmenr."
ili-ñtüiå* n.få.* Act 1969, c. +0, S$ t,8. See"generalþ Pilpel, Minors'Rights to
Medical Cáre, 36 Albany L. Rev. 462 (1972)'-- 
.
ss Mich. Stat. Ann. S åZîliìiigfjisìppl'igZ+1. In order to authorize the donation, the
p.oUut.-lorr.t 
-,rrt nnã'ìï.,-)ih;' i.oåf..tiu" ãono. is sufficiently, sound of mind to
understand the needs and probable .trrr.q.r.r.., of the gift to both.the donor and donee
;;Jã;r to th. gift." rã. th. p.onir,.. of q,rebec has en"acted a similar provision, Quebec
Civil Code art.20,s.g. ióZï. 8,4,noted'i1 Èoryk9r, Experimentation¡n Humans and Gifts
oi ii.rrr.' Articlei zfizã-oitrre iiuil cod., 19 McGil[ LJ' 161 (1973)'
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moral considerations involved in a transplant reach a level of complexity
and abstraction with which few children have experience. If the objective
of judicial proceedings is to protect the minor from ill-considered action,
it åppea., manifest tÉat minòr donors generally should not be treated as
adults for purposes of consent to donation.
Perhaps ìhe 
^administrative infeasibility of any other standard for au-
thorizing a minor's participation as a transplant donor will force the
courts to allow pard¿ipation only by those minors who are considered
competent to maÏe ail þersonal decisions. However, the development of a
reasånable merhod of applying the best interests test would avoid the
necessity of such a rest;i¿dve conclusion. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed below, the unacceptability of considering the minor's consent to be
legally effective does not preclude its use as eaidence in a court's applica-
tion of the best interests test'
D. The Best Interesß Test Reconsid,ered,
The Farinelh. court rejected the best interests test primarily because of
its belief that the only available evidence regarding benefit to the donor
was "speculative" psychological testimony concerning the relationshìp be-.
tween the donor ^and the-recipient.loo However, it may be possible to
develop more concrete evidence on this point. Such evidence would
enable courts to apply the best interests test in a more meaningful way.tot
A number of stuãies of adults who served as kidney transplant donors
indicate that those who have done so have derived great psychological
benefrt from the experience.loz The significance to adults of the act of
donation provides i rtrong basis for the conclusion that donation by a
minor may well produce psychological benefits, either at the time of the
act or in later lifé, thereby indicating that donation may be in the minor's
best interests and that he would consent if he were competent' There is
no psychological data, however, to support the view that all children
*onìd benefi1 psychologically. Thus, the question in each case remains
whether the donation will be beneficial to the particular prospective
donor. Nevertheless, further research into the psychological dynamics of
the donation decision and similar decisions may provide a basis for
psychiatric testimony that is less speculative than that presented in past
cases.1 03
1oo Slip op. at 5-7, 10.
ror p.t.¡i1o*¡cal testimony is given considerable_weight in juvenile proceedings' See;'-e;8^1,
painter í. Buttäirt.., 258 lówa"1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cnt. denied, 385 U.S. gag (1966);
Bradbook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future Develop-
ment of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Disputes, I I J.
Fam. L. 557 (1971).
ro2 S¿¿ note 2l suPra.
r03 A significant problem may deVelop if the psychiatric testimony consists of comparisons
berween rËe characieristics of íhe minór involveá and those of others who have benefrted
frorn altruistic acts. The danger lies in a courfs denying authorization jor q.particular
à""".t pirticipation in the "transplant because the coulrt finds that the child is not
sufficientiy ,r.t..lfi*h to derive satiifaction fiom the act. The possibility of harm to the
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An important, additional source of evidence of psychological benefit-
to be accorded greater or lesser weight depending on the age and matur-
ity of the minor-is the prospective donor's willingness to participate in
the transplant operation. In all of the reported transplant cases, except
those that involved very young or severely retarded individuals, the pro-
spective donors expressed willingness to make the donations. The fact
that the age of consent for most jurisdictions is 18 presumably reflects a
legislative belief that each individual who has attained that age is the best
judge of what is in his best interests.loa A reasonable implication of this is
that the individual's wishes should be accepted as atid¿nce of his best
interests, even when society believes that the individual is too young to
make the ultimate choice himself.los In transplant cases, it is suggested
that courts treat the willingness of the prospective donor to participate as
positive evidence that the donation would be in his best interests.
Of course, use of the minor's stated desire to participate as evidence of
his best interests presents serious problems. In a particular case, it is
difficult to determine the relative weight this evidence should be given. It
is even more difficult to delineate criteria for determining the ability of a
particular minor to decide what is in his best interests. The statutory
solution to the competence question-the relatively arbitrary designation
of the age of consent-reflects a recognition of the difficulty of develop-
ing more flexible criteria. Psychologists and psychiatrists may be no better
equipped than lawyers to develop and articulate clear guidelines by which
to judge a child's competence.l06 If relatively clear criteria are not formu-
lated, there will be a risk that a cost-benefit analysis will prejudice the
court's determination of the "best interests" question in favor of authoriz-
ing the transplant. Finally, to the extent that "consent" becomes an impor-
development of the child from such a finding could be minimized by restricting the tes-
timony regarding psychological benefit to the donor to positive evidence that supports a
finding of benefit.
104 Mill expressed succinctly the basis for generally accepting the individual'sjudgment of
his best interests: "iW]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be pos-
sessed by any one else."J. Mill, On Liberty, iz The Utilitarians 475,554 (1961). Mill recog-
nized, however, that "[t]hose who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury." Id.
at 484.
r05 Several states already make the preferences of children over certain ages binding or
extremely strong factors in custody awards. In addition, most states require written consent
of the child prior to adoption at a certain age. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among
Infants, Their Parents, and the State, Part II, 4 Fam. L.Q. 409, 441-42 (1570).
106 This possibility was illustrated by an interview with the psychiatrist who testified in
Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 74-109 (Mass., Oct. 4, lS74). Although he was not asked the
question in court, he was prepared to testify that the l4-year-old donor was competent to
consent to the operation. However, he acknowledged having difficulty upon being asked
whether he believed that she would be competent to decide to marry. Upon reflection, he
said that he would probably conclude that she was competent to make the marriage decision
if he were convinced, after questioning her, that she had deliberated as a competent adult
would. Interview with John O'Malley, M.D., Associate in Psychiatry, Children's Hospital
Medical Center, Boston, in Boston, Oct. l, 1974.
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tant evidentiary factor, the courts will have to set requirements for obtain-
ing the consent that ensure that it is fully informed. and acceptably
voIuntary.toT Nevertheless, these problems, although serious, should not
be prohititive. Hopefully, they .un b. dealt with adequately by establish-
ing procedures that ensure appropriate advocacy for the interests of the
donor.tos
A court adopting this suggestion should accept the willingness of a
prospective donor to participate as persuasive evidence if the donor has
ãl-oìt reached the age of majority and appears to be mature. In a case
involving a younger child o. a mentally incompetent individual, the court
should authorize-the transplant donation only if the prospective donor's
willingness is supplemented by substantial independent evidence of ben-
efit.lod On the other hand, the prospective donor's unwillingness to par-
ticipate should preclude the court from authorizing the operation unless
there is overwhelming evidence that the operation would promote the
donor's best interests.lro
Among the possible advantages to be obtained by using- the donor's
willingnJss to proceed as evidence of his best interests is that, together
with other evidence on the question, it might justify authorizing a trans-
plant in cases where the donor is too young to be considered competent
èven under a lowering of the age of majority.lll However, when the
potential donor is very young or mentally retarded, the best interests
itandard may still be impossiblè to satisfy. In order to carry the burden of
r07 This has already been done, to some extent, by the courts^and hospitals in Mas-
sachusetts. In recent bône ma.row áases, the hospitals hãve made informal efforts to relieve
fotential minor donors from any sense of pressúre_from either the hospital-or.parents and
io srrpply the minors with all oi th. i.tfo.-ation thought r-elevant to the decision. But see
LewiJ,'supra note 21, at 228. Guardians ad litem have typicaìly made predeterminations for
the court that the consent was informed and voluntary.
ro8 For discussion of procedural improvements suggested by this article see notçs 133-41
and accompanying text infra.
ros 5rr.¡^¡ni.pãndent ävidence could include an objective analysis of the alternative
consequences of participation in and refusal of a transplant,operation. S¿¿ Howard v.
fultori-neKalb Hósp. Ailth., Civil No. B-90430 (Super. Ci., Fulton. County, Ga., Nov. 29,
lg73) (the recipienf-the donor's mother-would probably die if.the transplant were not
perfóràed); stiunk v. strunk, 445 s.w.2d 145 (dêath of the recipient would deprive.the
ï.,u.4.¿ dãnor of his only sibiing, with whom the donor had a parìicularly strong relation-
ship).i'6 C¡. Inrø Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955). In that case, the appellate court
upheld the lower court's decision not to compel surgery to correct the hairlip and deftpalate
oå a l4-year-old. The lower courr had found ihat although surgery would 
-be highly¡.".n.iuí to the child physically, the child's opposition-_to. thè operations, based upon.his
belief in natural healing ,í¿ frii fear of surge{,'was sufficient to justify refusing authoriza-
rion. Id. at 82, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
rrr One autiror has concluded that the lowest age at which the mature minor rule, see note
94 suþra, has been applied is l5 years. Wadlinfton, suþra.note^94, at ll9,'.The author's
conclusion is based onã somewhat'controversialìnterprètation of Bonner u. Moran, and the
case law may not, therefore, justify an extension as far as I 5 years. However, even if this age
were accepted, a number ofMassãchusetts cases have involved donors below tbat age'-B.g.1
Nathan v.^Farínelli, slip op. (six-year-old); Camitta v. Alcorn, Eq.N9.74-23 (Mass., Feb. 14,
1974) (four-yeur-oi¿ .i""ä.)ì Camitta u. S.hilling.., Eq. No. 74-18 (Mass., Jan. 31, 1974)
(five- and eight-year-old prospective donors).
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ORGAN TRANSPI}INTS FROM MINOR DONORS l8l
proof, substantial evidence of benefit other than the donor's willingness to
participate will have to be introduced because very little weighr, if any,
can be given to the fact that the prospective donor is willing. Moreover, in
the case of a severely retarded donor, it may be impossible for the donor
to realize any psychological benefit.
In those cases in which the best interests standard would not permit a
court to authorize the transplant, there are only two alternatives open to
society. First, it can refuse to permit the operations despite the profound
consequences that a refusal will have for the recipient. Alternatively, it
may decide to authorize them not because they will promore the best
interests of the donor, but because the operations will promote the best
interests of the recipient at an acceptable cost to the doìor.112 However,
society could justifiably follow the latter approach only if it were prepared
to impose upon all citizens the same obligatíon.
At the present time our society does not appear ready to require adults
to donate organs or tissue for transplantation. Therefore, it is submitted
that the only justifiable basis upon which a court may authorize a
transplant involving a minor or mentally incompetent donor is on the
ground that it will further the best interesrs of the donor. Unlike the
utilitarian standard in Farinelli, the best interests test can be administered
to afford prospective minor donors the protection that the requirement
of consent provides adults. There is, to be sure, a danger that the stan-
dard will be applied in such a way that the resulr is derermined sub
silentio by weighing the respective costs and benefits. Whether the best
interests test will protect adequately the substantive interests of the pro-
spective minor donor is a function of the procedural protections that
are afforded the donor at the court hearing.
. 
IV. Tne Pnoc¡DURAL Pnosrel{s
In the overwhelming majority of bone marrow and kidney transplant
cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court, there has not been adequate
representation of the donors' interest in not participating in the trans-
plant. The court has never appointed guardians ad litem to represent
prospective kidney donors. Although it has appointed guardians ad litem
to represent bone marrow donors, the confusion concerning the proper
role of the guardian has precluded uniformly adequate representation.
This article will now examine the Massachusetts practice and demonstrate
how it has been procedurally unfair to minor donors. The primary rec-
ommendation of this article is that representation by guardians ad litem
be made mandatory in all transplant cases involving minor donors and
that the guardian's role be defined as that of a traditional adversary
rather than that of a master.1l3
r12 See text accompanying notes 65-88 suþrø.
1r3 Courts have recognized the value of having guardians ad litem represent the interests
of children in,proceedings involving intrafamily conflict and have employed such guardians
in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I.417, 238 A.?d 973 (1968t(custody
r82 BOSTON UNIVERSITY I}lW REVIEW
A. The System in Oþeration
In the recent bone marrow and kidney transplant cases, the general
partern has been for the hospital to b-ring a declaratory judgment action
àgainst rhe members of the family before a single justice o! the Supreme
liaiciat Court sitting in trial session.lla In those cases in which a guardian
äd tit"rn is appointeá, the court locates an attorney willing to serve in that
capacity and åppoints him to represent the child.115 The cases are usually
corcluáed ,nui?tly because of the time pressures created by the critical
illness of the poiential recipient and the fact that the action is not filed
until the doctors have decided to perform a transplant operation and
have found a compatible donor. Frequently, less than a week elapses
between the commencement of the action and the hearing on the
merits.l16 After a short evidentiary hearing, the court authorizes the
transplant and thereby immunizes the hospital lrom liability for any
nonnegligently caused injuries. Although an appeal fro-m.a- d-ecision of a
single J"ii.. ii"r to the iull bench of the Supreme Judicial Court,117 no
appeal has ever been taken.
'ih" prorpective kidney donor suffers more from procedural unfair-
ness beiausé no guardian ad litem is appointed to represent his interests'
One side of thelitigation will be controlled by the prospective donor's
parents, who will hJve decided that the transplant should-take place.lß
The other side will comprise the attending physicians and the hospital,
proceeding); wendland v. wendland, 29 wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965) (custody
þ."...di"[i. See ako Campbell, The Neglected.Chiìd: His and His Family's TreatmentÜnder Mas-sachusetts Law ånd Practices uñd Th.i. Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4
Suffolk L. Rev. 631, 681-84 (1970); Hansen, Guardiaäs Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody
Cases: Protection of the Chilà's Interests, 4J. Fam. L. t8l (1965); Note, An Appraisal of
New York's statutory Response to the Proble"ms of child Abuse, 7 colum. J.L' & soc' Prob'
51,67-68 (1971).íre g,r.¡'.ur.i hun. also been tried in the Suffolk County Probate Court. However,
because those records have been impounded on motion of counsel for the plaintiff, Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital, little is kiown about these cases and they will not be considered
in this section. S¿¿ note 48 suþra.
---tit fl. guardians ad litem who have represented bone marrow donors have g-enerally
been volunteers because the prospective donor is not in a position to pay counsel fees and
b..u..r. the Supreme Judicial Coúrt is understandably reluctant.to tax counsel fees either to
Suffolk County, the Õommonwealth, or the petitioner hospital'
116 Counsel lor the Children's Hospital Médical Center have taken the position that no
action should be filed until the transpiant physicians are certain that an acceptable donor is
available. However, once such a do.ror ii iáentified, the doctors generally, press for im-
mediate permission to perform the transplant. Thus, the filing ol a complaint is üsually
iãf1ã*.a'Uy the setting'of an immediate^hearing date. Such á situation makes adequate
.ãp..r.",ríi"" of the d"onor extremely diffrcult be-cause the_guardian ad litem can hardly- be
expected to prepare his case in the space of several days. Further, the situ^ation can lead to
ã'UI... 1ãi-iti"uir... ln Farinelli, the original complaint was frled in April t974' but' because
of changing medical circumsrances, no ãcdon wai taken t9 lppgilt a guardian ad litem until
two months later. Counsel for the Children's Hospital Uedical Center nevertheless insisted
on an immediate hearing following the guardian's;ppojntment. The hearing was.postponed
iå. u *..f., but it couldîave beeñ furtÉer postpo.reä because the transplant did not occur
for several weeks thereafter.
11? Mass. Gen. Laws ct'.2l4, $$ 19-29 (Supp' 1974-1975)'
1r8 S¿¿ Curran, suþra note 2, at 892.
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ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM MINOR DONORS 183
who also will have determined that the transplant should go forward but
who are unwilling to perform it unless the court insulates them from
liability.lle Both sets of parties, therefore, want the court to issue a decree
authorizing the transplant.lzo No one represents whatever interest the
child may have in not donating an organ or tissue. Consequently, it is
unusual to frnd more than a pretext of adverseness on any issue. The
family is often represented by its own counsel, but invariably the parents
admit or allege the facts necessary for authorization of the operation.121
It is highly unlikely that such proceedings can attain their ostensible
,objective of protecting the prospective donor's substantive interest in not
participating in the operation. The hospital and the parents assuredly are
not engaged in a dispassionate search for truth. They want the transplant
to occur and go into court with the intention of proving that the participa-
tion of the prospective donor is consistent with whatever standard the
court decides to apply. Because no party presents any evidence or argu-
ments that indicate that the child should not donate a kidney, the only
possible source of opposition to the petition for declaratory relief is the
judge, who might take the initiative and question the favorable evidence
and arguments of the parents and hospital. Unfortunately, there is little
incentive for a judge to adopt such a posture. He may recognize the grave
consequences of denying authorization and may perceive that the proba-
ble benefits to the recipient outweigh the possible costs to the donor.
When no one is charged with the responsibility for developing the case on
behalf of the donor nor anxious to raise all evidence and issues favorable
to the donor, it becomes too easy for the judge to gloss over the evidence
and issues in an effort to reach quickly and efficiently what seems to be
the right result. Of course, such action need not reach the level of a
conscious effort to take the path of least resistance. It may operate merely
through the unconscious development of a mental set as to the merits of
the case, blinding the judge to the lines of opposing argument and
evidence that could have been developed.lz2
The absence of adversary proceedings in these cases undoubtedly also
has contributed to the failure of the courts to develop adequate substan-
tive standards and to apply them consistently. Because advocates are not
tts See, e.g., Petition for Declaratory Relief, Nathan v. Farinelli, slip op,; Curran, suþra
note 2, at 892.
120 It is arguable that this coincidence of interests deprives the court ofjurisdiction over
the subject matter. Cf. Pickard v. Worcester, 338 Mass. 644, 156 N.E.2d 689 (1959) (there
must be an actual controversy between the parties for an action for declaratory relief to lie).
r2t See, e.g., kidney transplant cases cited note 15 suþra.
122 A joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Association of
Law Schools has cogently described the consequences of dispensing with adversary presenta-
tion of evidence and arsuments.
IF]ailure gen-era_lfy attãnds the attempt to dispense with the distinct roles traditionally
implied in adjudication. What generally occurì in practice is that at some early point â
laririliar palte"rn will seem to 
"rierge fóm the evidence: an accustomed label ii iraitinglor the case and. without awaitingfurther proofs. this label is promptly assigned to ir.-
Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the Joint Conference of theAmerican Bar Association of American Law Schools, 44 A.B.AJ. 1159, l160 (1958).
ii lj
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present to question the courts' bases for issuing the requested decrees, no
one has challenged the courts to justify their results.
The procedural unfairness to prospective donors tras been partially
mitigated in those cases in which the Supreme Judicial Courr has ap-
pointed guardians ad litem to represent the minor donors. Ironically, the
Massachusetts practice has been to appoint guardians in cases involving
bone marrow transplants, which generally entail only minimal risks to the
donors, but not in cases involving kidney transplants, which pose a sig-
nificantly greater threat to the well-being of the donors.123 Yet, even when
guardians ad litem have been appointed, frequently they have not fully
represented the interests of the prospective donors. There are a number
of reasons why they have not been fully effective.
The first is that the court often has appointed guardians who were not
disposed to represent the prospective donors with vigor. In several bone
marrow cases, doctors, rather than lawyers, were appointed.l2a As a class,
doctors certainly are likely to be more sensitive to the medical aspects of
the operation than to the donors' interesrs. This sensitivity may prejudice
such guardians' judgment of their wards' interests. In these cases,
moreover, the court appointed doctors who were eriployed by the very
hospitals seeking authorization to perform the operarions, thereby creat-
ing serious conflicts of interests. Even in the absence of such conflicts,
doctors are less likely to represent minor donors effectively than are
lawyers, who are accustomed to vigorous advocacy.
The second reason is that, in most cases, the guardians have functioned
as masters rather than as advocates;l25 they have conducted individual
investigations into the facts of the cases and have reported their findings
and conclusions to the courts, which have adopted them without excep-
don.126 Adopting the role of a master is both natural and understandable
123 S¿¿ note 2,0 suþra.
tza See, e.g., Camitta v. Fager, Eq. No. 73-171 (Mass., Sept. 5, 1973); Camitta v. Martinez,
Eq. No. 73-158 (Mass., Aug. 23, 1973); Camitta v. O'Mealia, Eq. No. 73-86 (Mass., Apr. 25,
1973); Nathan v. Clark, Eq. No. 73-71 (Mass., Apr. 12, 1973).
12s The traditional view of,the proper role of the guardian ad litem in most court
proceedings is that he is under an obligation to adopt an adversary posture on behalf of
whatever substantive interests his ward might assert. Sae Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 397,
399-400, 79 N.W. 439, 440 (1899). The guardian's duty to take all lawful steps to secure ajudgment favorable to his ward precludes the guardian from making any concessions. Seø
Rankin v. Schofreld, Tl Ark. 168,66 S.W. 197 (1902). The guardian, in addition, lacks the
power to bind his ward by admissions, waivers and stipulations, except as to minor pro-
cedural matters that do not affect the ward's substantive rights. Sea Kingsbury v. Buckner,
134 U.S. 650, 680 (1889). However, guardians ad litem have functioned quite differently in
some family law proceedings in recent years. See notes 126, 134 infra.
126 Apparently, this is a familiar role for guardians ad litem in some jurisdictions.
Guardians ad litem in Maryland and Virginia continue to perform in this maÀner in bone
marrow cases handled for the National Institutes of Health. S¿e In re Bostrum, Eq. No.
49385 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Md., June 7, 1974); In re Bachman, Fid. No. 20828(Cir. Ct., Fairfax County, Va., Aug. 9, 1974).
Statutory authorization exists for the appointment of guardians in certain Massachusetts
probate proceedings, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c!r'. 215, $ 564 (Supp. lS74-1975), and the
Supreme Judicial Court has the inherent po$/er to appoint guardians in other proceedings.
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for attorney-guardians. Attorneys are accustomed to making critical deci-
sions for their clients based either on consultation with their clients or on
the attorneys' views of what is in the best interests of the clients. In these
transplant cases, the guardians' wards are incompetent to give them
direction. Hence, it is natural for the guardians to make strategic deci-
sions for the prospective donors based on their own determination of
their clients' best interests.
The guardian's adoption of the role of master seriously undermines thejudicial decision-making process. A guardian-master necessarily will make
decisions based solely on his own invesrigations. If, for example, the
guardiân decides that the donor is likely to benefit, he will decide this ques-
tion without the aid of adversary development of the evidence. Because
of this predetermination, the guardian may not present the court with
arguments and evidence that suggest that the ward might not benefrt.
The court, consequently, cannot decide on the basis of a fully developed
record whether the donor's participation is consistent with the applicable
standard.
Several guardians have been reluctant to adopt the role of master
because they realized that to do so would leave their wards unrepre-
sented. The guardian in Comitta a. Schillingerr2T seriously questioned the
propriety of functioning as a master, and the guardian in Nøthan a.
FarinelJi refused to instruct the court as to whether he believed the
donation would be best for the prospective minor donor, contending that
it was the court's responsibility to make the critical factual and legal
determinations based upon a record fully developed by adversaries.l28
The guardian believed that the only means by which he could effectively
represent his ward would be to refuse to make frndings concerning the
best interests question and to present the evidence and arguments oppos-
S¿¿ Doe v. Doe, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1089, 314 N.E.zd 128. Both the Supreme Judicial Court
and the probate courts have broad discretion in defining the guardian's role. I)oe v. I)oe,
supra, in which an estranged husband sought to enjoin his wife from having an abortion,
illustrates the extent to which guardians ignore the interests of their ward in court proceed-
ings. In Doø, the guardian who was appointed to represent the interests of the fetus took the
position that his ward had no rights to be protected in the litigation and filed a brief
supporting this view. The court permitted the guardian to advocate this position although it
was clearly antagonistic to that of his ward. The court then permitted another member of
the bar to present the contrary position. Although the court's opinion fails to discuss the
novel problems of the guardian ad litem's professional responsibility, it seems that the
guardian ad litem, admittedly faced with a difñcult decision, acted improperly. Rather than
sacrifrce the interests of his ward, he should have withdrawn from the case. Furthermore,
the court sho¡rld have stricken his brief and appointed another individual-most appro-
priately, the lawyer who did defend the fetus'interests.See In reJaeçr's,Will,218 Wis. I,
ll-12, 259 N.W. 842, 846 (1935), in which the court struck the guardian's brief under
analogous circumstances. Although Doe a. Doe may be a striking example of confusion over
the proper role of the guardian ad litem, it is not unusual. The guardians in the bone
marrow cases have taken similar action, see, e.g., Report of Guardian Ad Litem, Nathan v.
Dyer, Eq. No. 72-177 (Mass.,.Dec. ll, 1972), and probably will continue to do so until
instructed to abandon the role of a master.
r27 Eq. No. 74-18 (Mass., Jan. 31, 1974).
r28 See Report and Memorandum of Guardian Ad Litem.
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ing the position taken by the hospital and the parenrs.l2e To develop a
suitable record for the court, therefore, the guardian filed motions and
presented the evidence and arguments that supported denial of autho-
rization of the transplant.ls' However, there have been very few Massa-
chusetts cases in which the guardians ad litem have adopted an adver-
sary position. t31
A third reason most guardians have not been effective is that they
usually are given little time to develop cases on behalf of donors-often
less than five days.132 This problem has been aggravated by the fact rhat
few guardians have had the opportunity to develop expertise in the area.
The final reason that the guardians ad litem have not provided their
wards with effective representation is that some justices of the supreme
Judicial Court have resisted the introduction of full adverseness into these
proceedings.rss The justices' resistance is partly a consequence of their
natural distaste for subjecting family members to full adversary inquiries.
But here, as in intrafamily and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the
imposition of some emotional burdens on famiiy mem6ers is neðessary
because the interests protected by the process are substantial and the costs
of using a nonadversarial system are quite high.
B. Means to Ensure Effectiae Representation of the Prosþectiae Donor
Courts should be required to appoint guardians ad litem to represent
prospective minor donors in all tránsplañt proceedings. The guárdian's
role should be defined as that of an advocare of the child's interest in
not acting as a donor; the guardian should be instructed to present all
* the evidence and arguments against his ward's donation and to oppose
the positions taken by the hospital and family, regardless of the guard-
ian's personal perception of the child's actual interests.
12e 'I'he statement of the guardian ad litem in Farinelli summarizes the reasons he adopted
an adversary Posture.
While one might be greatly tempted to conclude that the [donor's] interests in tbis case
can best be advanced by permitting her participation in the proposed procedure, I have
reached the conclusion that this isã.judrtment-for the Couri to'make.'To my mind, the
best way I can zealously protect andädvänce my client's interests is to assuré that sÍre is
provided with due process of law, and due procêss cannot be afforded unless the Court
has the benefit of à full adversary proceeding.
Id.. See also Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: ANon-Polar Approach, 6l Geo. LJ. 1401, l4l3-15 (1973).
r30 'I'he motions included a motion to dismiss or for an order authorizing an adversary
proceeding, a motion for continuance, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party (the United States),
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and an
answer containing counterclaims and cross-claims.
13t Farinellà and Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 74-l\g (Mass., Oct. 4, lS74), are rhe rwo
most prominent cases.
r32 S¿¿ note 116 suþra.
-ß3 For.example, the judge in Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 74-l0g (Mass., Oct. 4,1974), resisted the guardian's efforts to function as-a full adversar!. In the pretrial confer-
ence, thejudge stated that it was his desire that the guardian ad litem express his opinion as
to the correct result in the case.
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The circumstances surrounding these proceedings strongry support
having the guardian perform such a function. unleis therels ,o-áorr"
who advocates that no operation occur, there is no assurance that the
arguments against thd donor's participation will ever be seriously consid-
ered. Further, it is too 
€asy for anyone, even with the best motivés, to slip
into a cost-benefit analysis and advocate to the court that the operation
proceed. A transplant proceeding arguably differs from a juveniie delin-
quency case, for example, where, at least in theory, all concerned advo-
cate the optimal treatment among several alternative dispositions that are
theoretically designed to serve the best interests of the .¡¡¿.rra Even injuvenile delinquency proceedings, however, the rore of the guardian is the
subject of considerable controversy,lss and there is an eirerging trend
toward having the child's guardian function as more of a traditional
adversary. I 36
In transplant cases there are only two possibre dispositions, and the
parents and the hospital will provide all the evidence and arguments in
support of authorization. what is institutionally necessary if tÈe prospec-
tive donor is to be protected adequately is not the guardia.r's more
objective opinion whether the operation is in the child's Èest interests but
a party to present the arguments that support denying authorization.
Although it is essential that the guardián adopt r poitrrr. opposed to
the transplant and present all the evidence and àrguments in suþport of
rlenying authorization, ir does not follow that thã guardian strould be
obligated ro take every action that will diminish rh; likelihood of the
authorization of the operation. The guardian's function is to facilitate the
development of a full record and thus increase the likelihood that the
court's disposition will be consistent with the proper subsrantive standard.
The guardian need not employ every available sirategy nor appeal every
unfavorable decision. However, he should attempt to airor.àiì urry 
"rrí-dence introduced by the hospital, even if he behãves it to be essentially
accurate. The determination of the accuracy of the evidence is the courtis
function, no_t the guardian's. Like any other adversary, the guardian
should n-ot fe¡l obligated ro reveal evidence rhar favors the ñospital's
position but that its counsel failed to discover. unless counsel foi each
side feels tested, there is the danger that neither side will be motivated to
put forth its best efforts.137
134 For discussions of both the adversary and nonadversary aspects of the attorney's rolein represenúng the_child in delinquency próceedings see coxe, taivyers inJuvenile cJurt, l3
crime &-Delinq.488 (1967); Ferster, courrless & snethen, TheJuvenileJustice system: In
search of the Role of counsel, 39 Fordham L. Rev. z7E (lg7l); Isaacs, The Role of the
Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family court, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501 (lg68);
Kay &,Segal, suþra \ote 129; McMillan & McMurty, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the
Juvenile Court: Advocate or Social Worker, 14 St. Louis LJ. 561 (1970); Comnient, The
Attorney-Parent Relationship in theJuvenile courr, 12 st. Louis LJ. 609 (1968); comment,
The-Attorney and the Dispositional Process, l2 St. Louis LJ.644 (1968).
r35 S¿¿ McMillan & McMurty, suþre note 134.
t"^u_ Su, 9.9., In re Gault,387 U.S. I (1967); Kenr v. United States, 383 U.S. S4l (1966).137 Justice Jackson's observations concerning the analogous area of pretrial discovery are
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Determining which tactics are justifieci by the need for the development
of the record rvill be difficult and will require the careful reflection of
experienced, dedicated guardians. To promote the development of the
necessary expertise, this article recommends that a panel of guardians be
established to serve as advocates for the donors in all transplant cases'
Such a system would help attorneys acquire experience in functioning as
guardians and would enable them to develop the medical and psychologi-
cal expertise they need to function effectively.
To increase the protection afforded the' prospective donor, the Mas-
sachusetts legal system should take two further steps. First, to provide a
guardian ad litem with sufficient time to develop the donor's case, the
legislature should require that the hospitals notify the court at the earliest
possible time of the possibility that it will request court authorization of a
transplant involving a particular minor donor- Second, to provide a bet-
ter environment for hearing these cases, the legislature should encourage
their trial in the probate court. The probate court is experienced in
dealing with problems involving intrafamily conflict and tension,rss and
probate judges probably will be far more comfortable with the distasteful
necessity of subjecting parents to adversary inquiry than will the justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court.
The introduction of genuine adverseness into transplant proceedings
unquestionably has its costs. It will be painful for the family to subject
itself to adversary inquiries. The procedural tactics or arguments may
delay the authorization of urgent medical procedures and exacerbate the
parties' feelings of guilt and depression. Trial of these cases in the pro-
bate courts might mitigate these consequences, but, in any event, the
benefits of adverseness are substantial. It was not until the cases charac-
terized by vigorous advocacy on the behalf of the donor that the Mas-
sachusetts courts finally confronted several problems squarely: the basis
upon which transplants should be authorized;trs the measures that should
be taken to compensate the donor for injury resulting from the donation
procedure;la0 and the dangers of donating bone marrow'l41 Increased
ãnd more sophisticated use of the adversary process in these cases should
both improve the explicit development of the substantive legal principles
involved and provide prospective donors with the best possible protection
against ill-considered action.
þarticularly apt in this context: "[A] common law trial is and always sþould be an adversary
proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
function either without wit or on wits borrowed from the adversary." Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (concurring opinion).
r38 The jurisdiction of the Probate Court is set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 215, $ 3
(Supp. 1974-1975). The Probate Court has been able to retain a sense of informality during
essentially adversarial proceedings. S¿¿ Interview withJudge Mary Fitzpatrick,supra note 19.
rSs Nathan v. Farinelli, slip op.
1a0 Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J74-109 (Mass., Oct. 4, 1974); Nathan v. Farinelli, slip
op.lal Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 74:109 (Mass., Oct. 4, 1974); Nathan v. Farinelli, slip
op.
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V. CouprxseuNc THE Douon ron Hanvr Ceusnn ey
PlntrcrpetIoN rN r:gn Tnexspr¡.xr
Thus far, this arúcle has analyzed the Massachusetts transplant authori-
zation procedure in terms of its capacity to protect a prospective minor
donor's interest in not serving as an organ or tissue donor. However, the
legal system's concern with the prospective donor should not end with the
court's authorization of the transplant operation. Even when the court
finds that participation is in the minor dånor's besr interest, a possibility
exists that the donor will suffer serious physical or psychological harm.laz
Because donation by a minor is an act of extraordinary altruism per-
formed in a context in which the critical decisions are made not by the
minor donor but by a judicial tribunal, forcing the child to bear any loss
resulting from the donation seems grossly inequitable. Therefore, it is
highly desirable that the legal system develop a merhod for compensaring
minor donors for any harm they suffer as a result of their participation in
a transplant procedure.
No adequate system for donor compensation exists in Massachusetts.
The effect of the suits brought before the Supreme Judicial Court has
been to immunize the hospital and doctors from liability for nonnegli-
gently caused injuries.las Of course, the possibility exists that an injured
donor could bring a tort action against the recipient or his parents.laa
Flowever, intrafamily litigation obviously is not a desirable method of
compensating injured donors. First, the donor may experience difficulty
collecting a judgment in his favor. More important, the donor will natu-
rally hesitate to sue members of his own family. Ir seems inequitable nor to
ra2 See note 20 suþra.
ras See, e.g., Nathan v. Farinelli, slip op.; Masden v. Harrison, slip op. Cases in other
jurisdictions have assumed a variety of forms, including petitions for approval of parental
consent, In re Bachman, Fid. No. 20828 (Cir. Ct., Fairfax County, Va., Aug. 9, 1974), for
authority for an incompetent's committee to approve a transplant, Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145, for declaratory and injunctive relief, Howard v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth.,
Civil No. 8-90430 (Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga., Nov. 29, 1973.1, and an action by one
parent to compel the consent of another, Smith v. Smith, Eq. No. 43919 (Cir. Ct., Montgom-
ery County, Md., July 19, 1972).1aa Because the donor, recipient and parents are all defendants in the typical suit, it is
unlikely that the standard decree would preclude a determination in a subsequent proceed-
ing that the recipient or parents were liable to the donor. See F. James, Civil Procedure
s il.24 (1965).
An injured child is free to seek tort damages from a sibling, H. Clarke, The Law of
Domestic Relations in the United States $ 9.3 (1968), and recently many courts have
permitted children to sue their parents for intentional torts despite traditional family law
principles to the contrary. See id,. Ç 9.2, at 258-60; W. Prosser, suþra, noÍe 5, at 867-68. In any
event, the parents would be required to support the donor beyond majority if he were
injured by the donation and became totally dependent upon them. See, e.g., Perla v. Perla, 58
So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1952); Strom v. Strom, l3 Ill. App. 2d 354,361-67,142 N.E.zd 172,
176-79 (1957); In re Estate of Glass, 175 Kan. 246,250,262 P.2d 934,937 (1953); Clark v.
Graves, 282 S.W.2at 146, 148 (Ky. 1955); Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash. 39O,391,229
P.zd 333, 335 (1951). Some states now impose by statute a duty upon parents to support any
child unable to maintain himself. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. S 23-2302 (1974); N.D. Cent. Code
$ 50-01-19 (1974). Thus, on the basis of either common law or statute, parents in most states
would have a duty to support a child injured and incapacitated as a result of participating as
a transplant donor.
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provide the minor donor with a more satisfactory means of obtaining
compensation.
A possible solution may be for the court to require insurance coverage
for tire donor as part of its decree authorizing the transplant operation'
The question then becomes whether the recipient, parents, or hospital
should pay the insurance premium. If the insurance premium were
treated ãr purt of the cost of medical care for a transplant recipient, the
cost would probably be paid by the recipient's medical insurer.las Alterna-
tively, the court might require the parents to procure insurance covering
possible injuries to the donor. Both of these possibilities are unsatisfactory
because of the reluctance of insurance companies to provide coverage on
a case-by-case basis.lao The hospital is in the best position to negotiate
with the insurance companies for comprehensive protection of transplant
donors.laT An insurance company would be understandably hesitant to
issue a policy covering a single individual because of the difficulty in
determining an appropriate premium. Moreover, in the typical transplant
case, the recipient or parents would be seeking coverage on short notice'
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1a5 Some health insurers-for example, CHAMPUS, the military insurance program-for
dependents of armed forces personneÈalready assume the costs of the subsequent medic.al
caie. Interview with Albert Èroseghini, Ph.D., Director of Research Administration, Chil-
dren's Hospital Medical Center, Bosto.t, in Boston, Oct. 9, 1974. See generally 32 C.F.R.
$$ 577. 728,732 \1974).
- - 146 Lloyd's of London, for example, is interested in providing strict.liability insurance of
the kind sought in Farin¿lli but beliáves that serious involvement of the hospitals and medical
schools in rhé Boston area would make a substantial difference in the cost and coverage of
any insurance that Lloyd's might provide. Interview with James Lo-ngacre,_Wohlreich &
Aíderson (agent for Úloya's õf London), in Boston, Sept. ll, 1974; see'Transcript of
Hearing, Oct. 9, l9?4, at 42-44, Nathan v. Farinelli, ,slip op. But see id. at 38-39'r+z 6;'i¡,¡1¿r.rr'r' Hospital Medical Center has recently entèred negotiations with several
insurance companies io provide a medical benefit program for minor bone. marrow donors.
One company'out of thè seven that were contacted expressed an interest in developing an
acceptablê policy. Its preliminary proposal called for a premiu-m of $50_per donor and the
following siale of benèfits: $250,000 fór accidental loss of life; $250,000 for dismemberment
or loss õf sight; and up ro $2,500 per monrh in cases of total__disability..The insurance
company woüld exclude coverage for mental illness because such illness would be extremely
diffiäult'to diagnose. A. Yarchin & Co., Inc., Accident Proposal for Children's Hospital
Medical Center (on file at Boston University Law Review).
These negotiations indicate the magnitude of the problems that will accompany attemPts
to develop Jatisfactory insurance coverage for injured minor donors. Although one insur-
u.r...o-þuny did indicate a willingness-to devel,op the coverage, it did,so-"not because of
sound buiiness pursuit, but only bècause of their relationship with [Children's Hosp_ital's
agentl and their accepted civil and moral attitude to help Children's HolPitaì." l-etter from
Niicháel A. Virusso, A. Yarchin & Co., Inc., toJeffrey W. Lemkin, Feb. 14, 1975 (on file at
Boston University Law Review). The other insurance companies that were contacted had
several objectioni to providing coverage and expressed a general unwillingness to work with
the hospital.
However, the Aetna Insurance Company has provided the University of Washington with
insurance coverage protecting subjecis of human experimentation from nonnegligently
caused injuries foi several yeais at i cost of $.50 per experimental subject. The coverag-e is, a
rider ro füe University's piofessional malpracticè coueiage and has a total cost of $17,500
per year for 35,000 eiperimental subjects. Letter from Diãna McCann, Director of Research
Services, University ofWashington, Seattle, to Garrick Cole, July 2, 1974 (on frle at Boston
University Law Review).
r
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on the other hand, the- insurance company might be considerably lesshesitant to negotiate with the hospital for an insirance plan covering allprospective minor donors. Insurance companies would ápp.u. to be bet-ter equipped to devise a plan covering u .ru* of persons iËan they would
be to offer protection to a single individual against a fairly unusual sort of
risk. Additionally, the hospital undoubtedlyïould seek .overage well in
advance of any particular transplant case if it were required to insure allprospective minor dono^rs- Consequently, the insurance company andhospital would have sufficient time to airive at reasonable rates.
several courts have demonstrated a willingness to impose the costs of
insurance on the medical providers. one Maryland cóurt's decree ex-
pressly reserved the question whether the providers would be required to
offer the donor follow-up psychiatric .ur..rae In two cases, the S.rp..-"
Judicial court has considered requiring the hospital and docrors to ãbain
adequate strict liability insurance for the donor.14e As part of the decree
in Farinelli, the court required the hospital, its counsel and the guardian
ad litem to exert their best efforts to obtain such insurance ,.at a reason-
able cost" before the ffansplant operation took place.150 unfortunately,
the process of procuring r.asonably priced insurance took more time
than the urgency of that case permitteã. The guardian was able ro make
tentative arrangements for coverage with Lrõyd's of London, but the
court 
^found the policy to be unreasonable and authorized the transplantto go forward without insurance.rs I Før'inelJi is evidence of the difficuity of
developing.adequate, reasonably priced insurance coverage o., u .ur.lby-
case basis.
Finally, there is a possibility that the federal government might assume
part of the cost of obtaining insurance for minor donors. Bone marrow
transplant o,perations are partly financed by grants from the National
Institutes of Health.l'z In two cases, the Nati,onal Institutes of Health
committed itself to insure against any medical'costs that might be in-
curred by the donor as a result of the transplant.ls3
No. 43919, at 2 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Md., July 19,
Civil No. J 74-109 (Mass., Oct. 4, 1974); Nathan v. Farinelli, slip
r50 Partial Judgment and Interlocutory Order at 2.
. 
r51 Justice Quirico, who decided the Farineili case, held a hearing on the issue of donorinsurance in chambers on- August 23, 1974. After examining th"e only policy that was
available at that time, which would have covered only death 
"tã p..-"rréni di.ibility fo. "pre-mium of about $650, the judge declined to order its purchase.
_ 
152 Support from the Nationallnstitutes of Health and its component National CancerInstitute takes a variety of forms. For example, direct grants rnppó.t the Clinical Research
Center at the Children's Hospital Medical Cénter in BoJton, andìirese funds are available todefray the costs of bone marrow transplants that are not recoverable from private insurers.
S¿¿ Interview with Dr. Albert Broseghini,supra note 145. The National Insiitutes of Health
also provides technical services in thtse casés-for example, the provision of platelets for a¡g6ifient who has become sensitized to those available'locally. Interview wiìh Dr. David
Nathan, suþra note 17.
153 Affidavit of Robert G. Graw, Jr., M.D., Head of Experimenral Hematology section,
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Thus, the most effective means of protecting the minor donor would
seem to be to require the medical personnel to procure broacl insurance
policies covering all transplant donors.lsa Until the legislature enacts a
statute imposing this duty on the medical providers, courts should require
insurance coverage as a condition to authorizing the minor donor's par-
ticipation in' the operation.
VI. CoNcrusroN
As previously noted, the Massachusetts Special Legislative Commission
Concerning Human Clinical Investigation and Experimental Therapy
recently created a subcommittee to consider whether there is a need for
special legislation concerning organ and tissue transplants from minors.
This development is a favorable one because the legislature is best able to
develop'solutions to the problems that this article has described.
The Commission can perform a valuable service by considering the
standard that the courts should apply in deciding whether a prospective
donor should be permitted to participate in a transplant. In view of the
problems inherent in requiring a minor to serve as a donor in situations
in which it is not in his best interests, the best interests test should not be
abandoned as the sole permissible basis for authorizing a minor's organ or
tissue donation without further study. The kind of study that is needed is
most properly done by an investigative commission of the legislature. A
determination whether the best interests standard is workable in most
cases requires careful consideration both as to the probability that minor
donors will receive significant psychological benefit from participation in
the operation and as to the medical profession's capacity to predict such
benefit in individual cases. To determine what weight, if any, should be
given to the prospective donor's willingness to participate, the Commis-
sion should consider studies concerning the ability of minors of varying
ages to ascertain what is in their best interests. Investigations of this scope
are beyond the institutional competence of a trial court, especially one
that must render a decision in the life or death context of a typical
transplant case. On the other hand, it is precisely the type of an inquiry
that a properly staffed legislative commission is institutionally designed to
conduct.
If our legal system is to abandon the best interests test in favor of a
standard that empowers the parents to require a child to serve aE a donor
Pediatric Oncology Branch, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, Md.,In rø Bachman, Fid. No. 20828 (Cir. Ct., Fairfax County, Va., Aug. I, lS74);
Affidavit of James A. Stauchen, M.D., Clinical Associate, Pediatric Oncology Branch, Na-
tional Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md., In ra Rabins, Eq. No.
50190 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, ll{d., Sept. 9, 1974).
15a Some commentators have argued that the federal government should provide disabil-
ity insurance for all subjects of experimentation. S¿¿ Statement of Points and Authorities
Supporting Motion to Dismiss l0-15, Nathan v. Flanagan, Civil No. J 74-109 (Mass., Oct. 4,
1974); Note, Medical Experiment Insurance, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 965 (1970). Some gov-
ernmental programs have done so. ð.g., Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
$ 8l0l (1974). See also Capron, suþra note 86, ar 148.
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whenever the costs are acceptable-regardless of his best interests-the
appropriate branch of the legal system to do so is the legislature. For our
society to obligate one of its members to make this type of sacrifice would
constitute such a departure from our common law tradition that only the
legislature should take such action. The use of such a standard and its
application raises profound questions of democratic political philosophy.
Although the Massachusetts courts have the inherent power to institute
the needed procedural reforms, the commission recommendations in this
area will be valuable either to provide the impetus for judicial reform or,in its absence, to lay the groundwork for a legislative solution. The
reforms that are needed are uncomplicated but essential to the protection
of the class of prospective minor donors. The legal system must develop
some means to supply prospective minor donors with effective represen-
tation of their interests in not participating in the rransplant. This ãrticle's
primary recommendation is that the prospective minor donor be supplied
with a guardian ad litem who is instructed to present all evidence or
arguments adverse to the authorization of the transplant.
A final area in which the commission could serve a valuable function is
in recommending means to compensate minor donors for harm caused by
their participation in the operation. The most appropriate means for
doing so is the development of a system of mandatory disability insur-
ance. Legislative action is probably necessary to establish such coverage
because courts are restricted to responding to the needs of the cases
before them.
It has been 18 years since the Supreme Judicial court was first called
upon to deal with the difficult problems presented by this area of the new
forensic medicine. It is time that the Massachusetts legal syste,rn take
action to ensure that prospective minor donors are afforded the protec-
tions that the original decisions flrst attempted to provide.
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